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1. Introduction∗ 
For the past two decades the UN peacebuilding regime to assist societies emerging from civil 
war has steadily become more expansive, intrusive, integrated and visible. Most peace 
support operations now are multidimensional – covering the security sector, political 
transition, relief and economic recovery, statebuilding, and transitional justice – and target the 
underlying causes of conflict as well. Peacebuilding means ensuring that “exclusionary 
social, economic and political structures … [are not] left untouched, perpetuated or 
strengthened,” UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan declared when he inaugurated the UN 
Peacebuilding Commission in 2006.1  The language seemed tailor-made for Nepal, where the 
UN established a peace mission after the end of a ten-year civil war. Fuelled by many causes, 
the war developed against the backdrop of exclusionary structures in social, economic and 
political life, most of which remained intact when the peace agreement was signed in 2006. 
Yet the UN operation to help consolidate peace was not designed as a multidimensional 
peacebuilding mission. Rather, it had a razor-thin mandate. As ‘a special political mission’ of 
limited duration, UNMIN (United Nations Mission in Nepal) did not even have peacekeepers 
or an explicit ‘good offices’ function to mediate in old or new conflicts. UNMIN thus 
belonged to a small category of UN peace operations. Out of slightly more than 50 operations 
in 2008, only perhaps half a dozen were similarly minimalistic.2 
 
This paper explores why this was so, and what were the consequences for peacebuilding. The 
point of departure is the common claim in much of the academic literature that broad 
international support to consolidate peace in a post-war setting is critically important and, 
while not sufficient, has a necessary quality.3 The claim - which has provided intellectual 
underpinning for the remarkable expansion of the international peacebuilding regime in the 
post-Cold War world - suggests that either Nepal is truly an exceptional case, or the peace 
process is highly vulnerable.  
 
There is, however, a different perspective. Increasingly, the consensus in the aid community 
is that peacebuilding, like development, requires a core of local ownership if it is to succeed. 
A recent UN report that codified the collective and received knowledge about peacebuilding 
emphasized the critical importance of national ownership.4 This perspective has a rich 
intellectual tradition as well, particularly in the development literature.5 If correct - and if the 
 
                                                     
∗ The author is grateful for detailed comments on an earlier draft by Magnus Hatlebakk, Ian Martin, 
Chaitanya Mishra, and Teresa Whitfield. The author remains responsible for the final formulation. 
1 Inaugural session 23 January 2006, www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-32294694_ITM 
2 Other small UN misisions were located in Somalia and Guinea Bissau, and 3 political missions covering a 
region, consisting of a one-person type office. www.un.org/dpa  
3 For instance, Michael W.Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace. United Nations Peace 
Operations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006; James D. Fearon, and David D. Laitin. "Neotrusteeship 
and the Problem of Weak States, International Security, vol.28( 4 ), Spring 2004, pp.5-43;Stephen Krasner, 
“Shared Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States,” International Security, vol. 29(2), Fall 
2004, pp. 85-120; Paul Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap. Civil War and Development Policy. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003; Stephen John Stedman  et al., (eds)., Ending Civil Wars, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne 
Rienner, 2002; Barbara F. Walter, “Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” International Organization, vol. 51, 
no. 3 (Summer 1997).  
4  Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict. 11 June 2009. 
A/63/881-S/2009/304 
5 The literature is vast. For a summary see Mick Moore and James Putzel, "Thinking Strategically about Politics 
and Poverty," Brighton: IDS Working Paper 101, 2000; for donor perspectives, OECD/DAC, Shaping the 21st 
Century Paris: OECD, 1996: for a southern perspective, Rehman Sobhan, "Aid Effectiveness and Policy 
Ownership,"Development and Change vol. 33 (3), 2002, pp. 539-548; and for ownership in a broader critique of 
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national ‘owners’ indeed are dedicated to peace, as the theory seems to assume – it suggests a 
measured and moderate role for international assistance. Although aid in theory can promote 
national ownership, in practice the two are often conflictual insofar as external aid tends to 
encourage dependence, ‘crowd out’ rather than ‘crowd in’ national efforts, or produces a false 
sense of partnership.6 In this perspective, the prospects for peace in Nepal would seem bright: 
it is widely accepted that the Nepalese have succeeded in maintaining a great deal of national 
ownership over both the civil war and the peace process that followed.   
 
Either way, the Nepalese case is worth exploring. The analysis below is built around a thick 
historical narrative. It starts with the war and the tortuous process of negotiating peace, which 
is the genesis of Nepalese claims to national ownership and the minimalist UN mission. 
2. Ending the war 
Nepalese exceptionalism starts with the war. A faction of the Communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoist) launched a People’s War in 1996, well after most communist parties and states 
elsewhere in the world had collapsed. The party, CPN(M), was a home grown movement of 
strongly nationalist revolutionaries. Outside Nepal they were only supported by solidarity 
networks of revolutionary splinter groups in India and a few other countries. Their ideology 
was familiar to Naxalites and other radical-left movements in the subcontinent, but otherwise 
seemed a faint echo of revolutionary struggles that belonged to a previous era in Asia and 
Latin America. The leaders came from Brahmin hill castes of modest means (although not so 
poor that they could not afford to educate their sons). The section of the party that split off to 
declare People’s War had only a handful of followers and, it was said, two rifles.7 
Metaphorically that seems true. Ten years later, when the Maoists signed a peace agreement 
and the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) turned in their arms for UN registration, there were 
only 3500 weapons. A list compiled a couple of  years earlier by Indian intelligence sources 
showed that most of the arms were old-fashioned 303 rifles (standard issue in the British 
Commonwealth from 1880 to 1950) and some guns were home-made.8 They had relatively 
few semi-automatic rifles and none until they started raiding the armouries of the Nepal 
Army in late 2001. 
 
The peace process was largely home grown as well. Although unfolding in the constraining 
shadow of Indian interests, the timing and direction of peace talks were chiefly determined by 
domestic political forces, that is,  the relationship between  the King and the mainstream 
political parties, the  ability of the Maoists to adjust strategically to unfolding events, and the 
mobilization of ‘people’s power’ at a critical juncture.  
 
The insurgency was feeding on numerous sources of discontent – long-standing and 
systematic social exclusion of low-caste and other marginalized groups, widespread poverty, 
regional inequities, elite control over the state and its privileges, as well as over the 
democratic process instituted in 1990, and the often overbearing role of neighbouring India. 
The Maoists framed their struggle in terms of a 40-point manifesto for social change and a 
nationalist foreign policy that had served as a declaration of war in 1996, but consistently 
followed a dual track of political and military struggle. As the party leader, Prachanda (nom 
                                                                                                                                                       
development cooperation, David Sogge, Give and Take, What’s the Matter with Foreign Aid. London: Zed Press, 
2002.  
6 Rita Abrahamsen, “The power of partnerships in global governance,” Third World Quarterly, vol.25 (8), 2004, 
pp. 1453-67. 
7 Deepak Thapa with Bandita Sijapati, A Kingdom Under Siege. Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency. Kathmandu: The 
Printhouse, 2004, p. 98. 
8 Ashok Mehta, The Royal Nepal Army, New Delhi, Rupa&Co.2005, p. 95. 
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de guerre) later emphasized, the People’s War started in the parliament and thus could also 
end there. “For three years we struggled inside Parliament….. So the seeds of our armed 
struggle were sown inside Parliament, in a manner of speaking.”9 The party’s widely 
publicized Second National Conference in February 2001 recognized the importance of 
political mobilization and political struggle in the People’s War. With an ideological stance 
that at least implied the possibility of negotiations, the Conference demanded what was to 
become a key item in later negotiations - an elected constitutional assembly to draw up a 
framework for restructuring the state. 10 
 
The government initially treated the insurgency as a law and order problem, but by the end of 
the 1990s recognized the need to address its political dimensions. A high-level commission 
led by a future Nepali Congress (NC) prime minister set up in 1999 to examine “the Maoist 
problem” concluded that the insurgency sprang from “defects in the handling and 
management of statecraft…social discrimination, unemployment and economic 
development”.11 When the head of the commission, Sher Bahadur Deuba, shortly afterwards 
became prime minister, he staked his political fortunes on the possibility of ending the 
insurgency through negotiations. At the time, opinion surveys also showed that the public 
wanted a political solution to the conflict.  
 
The critical event that paved the way for the first formal talks between the rebels and the 
government lay elsewhere. The Palace massacre on 1 June 2001, in which King Birendra and 
almost all his family were shot, changed the balance of forces in the organizing triangle of 
Nepalese politics. It had earlier been surmised that the King and the Maoists had at least a 
tacit common interest in opposing the mainstream political parties, and a channel of 
communication had in fact been opened between the two. The national shock over the 
massacre and rumours that Birendra’s younger brother, Gyanendra, soon to become the new 
King, was complicit in the killings now encouraged the Maoists to explore a possibly 
common interest with the mainstream parties in limiting the power of the King. The Maoists 
struck out boldly. “Now is the duty of all nationalist Nepalis to help in the establishment of a 
republic”, the party chief ideologue Baburam Bhattarai wrote.12 Yet this was still several 
years in the future. At the time, the Nepali Congress government was firmly against both a 
republic and the Maoist demand for a constituent assembly. The government was also taken 
aback when the Maoists just six weeks after the palace massacre showed their strength by 
abducting 69 policemen. An alarmed government for the first time called in the army to deal 
with the insurgents.  However, the army – still the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) with a 
command structure and organization closely linked to the Palace – dispatched a contingent 
that chose not to engage the militants. The showdown with the Palace forced Prime Minister 
G.P. Koirala to resign and opened the door for his party rival, Sher Bahadur Deuba. Prime 
Minister Deuba declared a cease fire and a month later, in August 2001, the first round of 
talks between the government and the Maoists opened. 
 
                                                     
9 He continued: “This is a very big difference between us and, say, those in India who say they are 
waging a people's war. They didn't begin from inside Parliament. We were inside Parliament, so we 
had good relations with the parliamentary parties for a long time.” “Exclusive interview with 
Prachanda, Maoist leader”, with Siddharth Varadarajan of The Hindu, conducted at an undisclosed 
location in the first week of February 2006. http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/nic/maoist.htm 
10 The importance of a constitution promulgated by an elected assembly rather than granted by the King had been 
a central issue in Nepali politics for half a century, and had been an agenda item at the first convention of the 
original Communist Party of Nepal in 1954. Thapa, op.cit., p.24. 
11 The Deuba Commission, cited in Krishna Hachhethu, “The Nepali State and the Maoist Insurgency, 1996-
2001,” in Michael Hutt (ed.), Himalayan People’s War: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion, London: Hurst, 2004,  p. 67 
12 Cited in Thapa, op.cit.  p. 118. 
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2.1 2001-02: Negotiations and return to war 
The groundwork for talks had been laid through back-channels arranged by Nepalese 
intermediaries close to the Nepali Congress party and the Maoists, as well as through direct 
talks between high-ranking leaders of the two parties.13 The formal talks started off well 
despite deep differences over substantive issues, and included a round held in the Maoist 
stronghold in Western Nepal, an implicit recognition of the de facto parallel government of 
the Maoists. After three months, however, the Maoists abruptly withdrew and re-launched the 
military struggle with a surprise offensive unprecedented in intensity and scope. PLA units 
and supporting village militias attacked several government posts, including in the eastern 
region that until then had been securely in the government zone. They kidnapped and killed 
district officers, stormed police posts, robbed banks to increase revenues, and for the first 
time attacked an army post. Quickly overwhelming the RNA, they carried off 12 truckloads 
of arms, including modern, semi-automatic weapons that significantly upgraded the PLA’s 
equipment standards.  Maoist leader Prachanda later described the attack on the army barrack 
in the mid-western Dang district as a turning point in the war.14 
 
The attack on the army barrack took place only two days after the Maoists had called of the 
negotiations. The timing strongly suggested that the Maoists had used the negotiations and 
the four-month long cease-fire to prepare for a new offensive. Denying this, the Maoists 
justified their withdrawal from the talks by citing firm NC opposition to their principal 
demands – institution of a republic, election of a constituent assembly, and renegotiation of 
the 1950 unequal Treaty with India.15 
 
The breakdown in talks signalled a new round of war, now fuelled by international 
developments. When the Maoists returned to the armed struggle in November 2001, the 
United States and its allies had just launched a global ‘war on terror’ to avenge the 9/11 
attacks on the US. In Nepal, prime minister Deuba, stung by what he considered a betrayal of 
his commitment to a negotiated solution, quickly branded the Maoists ‘terrorists’ and 
proclaimed a state of emergency. A ‘long year’ of escalating violence followed. The US and 
the British governments started to provide military assistance the Nepal Army, and the Indian 
government sharply upgraded its existing assistance program. The Bush-administration 
placed the Maoists on various sanction-inducing lists of ‘terrorists’, and the Nepalese 
parliament passed anti-terrorist legislation aimed at both party members and their supporters. 
An armed police force was established to battle the Maoists, and regular army units were 
deployed as well. The militants nevertheless kept pace by counterattacking and expanding the 
war geographically. Maoist front organizations staged strikes and demonstrations in the urban 
areas, including the capital. For the country as a whole, the enormous costs of a civil war 
were brought home. 16 
 
                                                     
13 For a detailed analysis of the talks, with an emphasis on the international role, see Teresa Whitfield, Masala 
Peacemaking. Nepal’s Peace Process and the Contribution of Outsiders, New York, October 2008. 
http://www.cic.nyu.edu/staff/Staff%20Docs/Teresa%20Whitfield,%20Masala%20peacemaking%20in%20Nepal,
%2010_%202008.pdf 
14 Anirban Roy, Prachanda. The Unknown Revolutionary, Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point, c. 2008, 
p.71. 
15 The demand for a republic had been too much even for the smaller leftist-communist parties. 
Prachanda had met with them in West Bengal just prior to the formal talks with the government and in 
vain asked them to support the abolition of the monarchy. Whitfield, op.cit. 
16 For different perspectives on the costs of the war, see Thapa, op.cit. pp. 139-157, Mukta S. Lama-
Tamang, Sumitra M. Gurung, Dharma Swarnakar, and Sita Rana Magar. 2003. Social Change in Conflict 
Areas: 
Assessment Report. Prepared for UK Department for International Development (DFID) Nepal, and The World 
Bank, Resilience Amidst Conflict: An Assessment of Poverty in Nepal, 1995-96 and 2003-4. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTNEPAL/Resources/Resilience_Amidst_Conflict.pdf 
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Yet the door to negotiations was kept ajar. “[W]e are ready to be involved in talks, dialogue, 
fronts or show any kind of flexibility….We have never closed the door for talks to find a 
political solution and we will never do so in the future,” Prachanda declared on  the 6th 
anniversary of the People’s War in February 2002.17  The principal impetus to a new halt in 
the war once again came from the Palace. King Gyanendra had progressively asserted his 
power vis-à-vis the parliament and the mainstream political parties and in October 2002 
executed a mini-coup by centring executive authority in the Palace. The changing balance in 
the triangle again led to negotiations where the parties could feel each other out and explore 
alignments. The Maoists, according to some reports, were now more interested in negotiating 
with the King than with the mainstream parties. A ceasefire in January 2003 was followed by 
informal talks and then formal negotiations (May-August).  
2.2 2003-04: More negotiations and another round of war 
The 2003 negotiations took place in Kathmandu, and, as during the previous round, focused 
on the Maoist demands for an elected constituent assembly and a republic. The government, 
now led by prime ministers from a small, royalist party (RPP), rejected both. The break-down 
of the talks, however, was triggered by the army killing of 19 Maoists after capture in what 
appeared as a deliberate attempt to sabotage the peace process. In Kathmandu, the Maoists 
continued negotiations for ten more days before declaring on 27 August 2003 that the cease-
fire was over.  
 
Another ‘long year’ of war followed. The Maoists now demonstrated a  ‘phenomenal’ ability 
to mount large-scale attacks, using ‘stealth, distraction, storm tactics and lightning speed’, an 
Indian military analyst wrote.18 Yet by the end of the year their scheduled move to a ‘strategic 
offensive’ was not in evidence. Moreover, while the Maoists could undermine the power of 
the state in the capital by staging bandh and agitations, they could not hope to capture the city 
and lacked the capacity to capture and hold even provincial centers.  Another sign of the 
party’s vulnerability was the arrest in early 2004 of several high-ranking cadres in India, 
where Maoist leaders until then had enjoyed de facto sanctuary. On the government side, the 
signs were also mixed. The Nepal Army was being retrained and outfitted for counter-
insurgency operations with assistance from India, the US and the UK, but transforming an 
army whose previous functions had chiefly been ceremonial and in international 
peacekeeping was slow and difficult.  
 
The military stalemate brought the possibility of a political dialogue to the surface. Prachanda 
soon made conciliatory statements. While "we are committed to fighting...let there be no 
doubt that we are open [for negotiations] to creating an environment whereby people’s 
mandate, freedom are solicited in a legal manner. This is our humble request." To underline 
the emphasis on the dialogue option, Prachanda for the first time called for UN ‘mediation 
and observation”.19 By mid-year, ex-prime minister Deuba was reappointed to head the 
government and one of his first official acts was to appoint a high-level Peace Commission. 
Sensing an opportunity, major European donors, civil rights and human rights groups and 
United Nations representatives redoubled their efforts to restart the peace process. A UN 
official, Tamrat Samuel, had since August 2003 patiently shuttled between New York, Delhi 
and Kathmandu. Several NGOs that specialized in peace mediation were also offering their 
services as facilitators and mediators; one organization had been doing so since 2000.20  
 
                                                     
17 Cited in Thapa, op.cit,.p.132. 
18 Mehta, op.cit., pp. 25-26.  
19 Statement, reported in Kathmandu Post, 5 February 2004. 
20 See Whitfield, op.cit. 
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The utility of these mediation or facilitation efforts is difficult to asses. The Nepalese used 
them where it was advantageous to their position. The Maoists, in particular, appreciated the 
implication of legitimacy bestowed by international attention. UN sources later claimed that 
its early engagement had helped to introduce ideas of UN monitoring and assistance in 
relation to cantonment and the elections that eventually found their way into the peace 
agreement. Mediators of various kinds carried messages and facilitated contact, although by 
2004, the Nepalese had already engaged in two rounds of negotiations and did not lack in 
contact channels. When a new opening for talks appeared in 2005, the Maoists and the 
mainstream communist party (CPN-UML) met frequently in Nepal and in India on their own 
accord to prepare the way for talks that eventually produced the important 12-point 
Understanding.  But in 2004 the time was not yet ripe. The military stalemate was 
increasingly obvious and mutually hurting – neither side could inflict a decisive military 
victory on the other – but this was not sufficient to shift the conflict into the political arena. 
For a conflict to be ‘ripe’ for settlement, in William Zartman’s now classic formulation, the 
parties also needed to recognize the costs of continued war as prohibitive and discern a way 
out. 21 Other political scientists of the rationalist school have emphasized that ‘a way out’ 
have to be associated with gains, whether a joint gain in terms of agreed upon principles for 
the transition, or a gain by one party relative to the other.22 Transposed to the Nepal case, it 
suggested a change in the balance of power or the structure of incentives was required.   
2.3 2005: The decisive turn towards peace 
The decisive factor that gave new momentum to the peace process originated in domestic 
politics, and – again – in the Palace. On 1 February 2005, the King dissolved the parliament, 
imprisoned politicians, cracked down on the media, and declared an emergency. The coup 
signalled ‘a return to the heavily discredited Panchayat system of top-down representation 
through which the Palace and a small elite had ruled for three decades until 1990,’as a close 
observer wrote.23 As the state became synonymous with the Palace, the common interest of 
the Maoists and the mainstream political parties – now in opposition to the King and referring 
to themselves as ‘the agitating parties’ – also became clearer. Both stood to gain from a 
restructuring of the state, and the discussion of terms started in earnest over the summer.  By 
November 2005 the parties had arrived at the general principles of restructuring, issued in the 
form of a 12-point Understanding that embraced constituent assembly elections, multiparty 
democracy and an end to “autocratic monarchy”.24 The principles expressed the expectation 
of joint gain in the transition period; in the longer run, each no doubt hoped to gain relative to 
the other through the political process.  
 
The 12-point Understanding was a roadmap for the further peace process that  in retrospect, 
at least, appears as a ‘critical juncture’ in the sense that it launched future developments onto 
one out of several plausible paths.25 It turned out to be a remarkably accurate guide to future 
events as well.  The Understanding proclaimed that ‘implementing the concept of absolute 
democracy through a forward-looking restructuring of the state has become an inevitable 
 
                                                     
21 I. Willian Zartman, Ripe for Resolution. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985/89. 
22  Doyle and Sambanis, op.cit. 
23 Towards a Lasting Peace in Nepal: The Constitutional Issues.  International Crisis Group (hereafter ICG), Asia 
Report No 99, 15 June 2005,  pp. 8-11. 
24 Letter of Understanding. (Unofficial translation). Kathmandu, November 22, 2005. 
http://www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?&nid=57858 
25 See Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures Theory, Narrative, and 
Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” World Politics, vol.59 (April 2007), pp. 341–69. The turning point 
was less obvious at the time, even to some very well-informed observers like the ICG. See Nepal’s New Alliance: 
The Mainstream Parties and the Maoists. Asia Report No 106, 28 November 2005.  
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need.’ To this end, the parties agreed to end ‘autocratic monarchy’ (without declaring a 
republic), and to hold elections for a constituent assembly. In a clear sign that significant 
hurdles remained, disagreement on the procedure for forming an interim government was 
written into the Understanding. The Seven Party Alliance of mainstream parties wanted a 
government based on a restoration of the Parliament that the King had dismissed (and where 
the Maoists, of course, were not represented), while the Maoists wanted a national political 
conference to establish an interim government. But all agreed that, regardless, the way 
forward was to create ‘a storm of nationwide democratic movement”, as Point 1 declared.  
The storm was in fact duly organized – although more by the actions of civil society than the 
established parties. A few months later, in April 2006, a massive, popular movement of 
nationwide protests shattered the monarchy and paved the way for the restoration of 
democratic institutions and the final peace agreement. 
 
The 12-point Understanding committed the Maoists to ‘move along the new peaceful political 
stream’. Yet they would not surrender their arms in the transition period, and certainly not 
before the elections. In part, historical precedents of deceit suggested caution. On earlier 
occasions, the present mainstream political parties had confronted state power but ‘the 
establishment failed to keep its promises, particularly [by keeping] the convening of a 
Constituent Assembly pending for over five decades,’ as a sympathetic Indian analyst later 
noted. 26 Keeping the PLA intact until after the elections had more direct purposes as well. If 
the Maoist could not achieve revolutionary change through the peace process, they retained a 
credible option to return to armed conflict. Prachanda discussed the options for restructuring 
of the army in a frank interview with the Indian newspaper The Hindu in early 2006. Ideally, 
he said, the democratic elements of the Royal Nepal Army would go into a ‘new Nepal 
army’, to be established on the basis of the ‘verdict of the masses’ as expressed in the 
Constituent Assembly. If the Assembly decided on a republic, the present leadership of the 
army would have to go and – by implication – the leaders of the People’s Liberation Army 
would move in. ‘If a constitutional monarchy wins, then there is the danger that the old 
generals will remain’, and – by implication – the conflict would continue.27 Of course, 
maintaining a rebel army during elections and for an undefined transition period cast doubt 
on the Maoists’ commitment to ‘move along the new peaceful political stream’. The point 
was obvious to the party leadership as well, and it was in this context that the UN was most 
useful: “We want the involvement of the United Nations to create an atmosphere of 
confidence so that possession of weapons by us does not become a stumbling block in the 
peace process,” Prachanda told journalists as negotiations on the 12-point Understanding 
were nearing conclusion.28   
 
The formula in the 12-point Understanding placed the army of the people and the army of the 
King on an equal footing. Both the PLA and the RNA would be ‘under the supervision of the 
United Nations or any other reliable interntional supervision’ during the constituent assembly 
elections to ensure the elections were free and fair and the results accepted.’ (Point 3). The 
reference to ‘any other’ agent was apparently inserted at the insistence of the Indian 
government, 29 which had grave reservations about inviting the UN into a peace operation in 
its immediate neighbourhood. Yet the reference was hardly more than a symbolic assertion of 
India’s pre-eminence in the subcontinent. Given Nepalese sensitivities about its large and 
sometimes overbearing neighbour, and the fact that the Indian government had given 
militarily aid to the Nepal Army during the war, India could not credibly supervise the two 
armies during an election designed to end the civil war. A neutral third party was called for, 
and the UN was the self-evident piece in the puzzle. At the time, this was less obvious. 
 
                                                     
26 Frontline, December 2-25, 2006. 
27 The Hindu, February 2006 (see n. 9).  
28 Keshav Pradhan, “A walk on the dark side with Prachanda,” Times of India, 13 September 2005. 
29  Whitfield, op.cit.  
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Reading the 12-point Understanding when it was first reported, one close observer later 
recalled, UN supervision of the PLA ‘felt very far from a done deal!’ 30 
 
It took another year before the peace agreement was finalized.  In the meantime, one critical 
event unfolded as per the sequence anticipated in the 12-point Understanding. The parties had 
agreed that ‘autocratic monarchy’ must end before the elections to a constituent assembly 
could be held. The ‘nationwide storm of democratic protest’ to bring this about took place in 
April 2006, although launched by civil society actors who in effect compelled the political 
parties to follow. Called Jana Andolan II, the popular movement forced the King to restore 
the Parliament, which formed an interim government and concluded the final peace 
agreement with the Maoists. 31   
 
As primarily a roadmap only, the 12-point Understanding left many outstanding issues to be 
dealt with before the peace agreement could be signed in November 2006, including the role 
of the parliament, the pre-conditions for the Maoists joining the interim parliament and the 
interim government, and principles for the management of arms and armies. Further 
understandings in point form were issued in some areas, but failure to agree on other 
questions – particularly with respect to integration of armies – produced deliberately vague 
formulations in the final agreement.  Signed in November 2006, the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement was generally long on principles but shorter on specifics. It called for a 
democratically and socially inclusive Nepalese society, affirmed the rights of individuals and 
groups, and specified in some detail – although not in all areas - the mechanisms regulating 
the transition to peace and the role of the United Nations in this regard. 
3. What made the peace agreement possible? A 
national process in the shadow of India 
The decisive momentum towards peace in 2005-6 arose from the changing balance of power 
among the three poles of Nepalese politics. The King’s autocratic ambitions in an era of 
democracy, as well as his misrule and arrogance of power, mobilized virtually the entire 
political spectrum in opposition to the Palace. The mainstream/agitating parties temporarily 
buried their differences and united in a Seven Party Alliance soon after the King’s February 
coup. The Maoists repaired splits over strategic directions within the party at the Rolpa 
plenum in August 2005, firmly coming down in favour of multiparty democracy and thus 
making the 12-point agreement possible.   
 
Nepal’s vibrant civil society mobilized as well. Both the parties and civil society drew on 
traditions of political mobilization and agitation that had developed over half a century of 
political contest and was further refined by the numerous Maoist front organizations 
established during a decade of revolutionary struggle. Frequent bandh(strike) became a staple 
in the inventory of political agitation.  More generally, civil and political groups had been 
energized by the democratic period in the 1990s, which had underlined the potential, if not 
the reality, of inclusive and participatory forms of government. Against this ideal, the King’s 
actions appeared particularly regressive.  
 
In a broader perspective, it is clear that underlying changes in socio-economic structures 
related to the development process had created conditions for both the war and its resolution 
 
                                                     
30 Teresa Whitfield, communication with the author, 28.08.2009 
31 Jana Andolan I (the first people’s movement) in 1990 ended the Palace-directed system of representation 
(panchayat), legalized political parties and reintroduced a directly elected parliament.  
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within the framework of political democracy. Socio-economic transformations over the past 
half a century had undermined the foundations of the monarchy and Nepal’s semi-feudal 
institutions. These changes had laid the basis for the Maoist challenge as well as the massive 
demonstration of ‘people’s power’ in the first half of 2006. As sociologist Chaitanya Mishra 
argues, large-scale migration from the countryside to the urban areas, and to employment 
abroad, had altered the social landscape.32  The role of agriculture in the economy had 
declined, as had the social value of land. Economic growth during the 1990s had produced a 
measureable reduction in poverty from 42 percent in 1995 to 31 percent in 2003 and 
improved living conditions for some of the lower castes and other marginalized groups.33 
Literacy rate and health care services had improved markedly for the population as a whole. 
Economic empowerment and social mobility have historically generated demands for 
political participation by politically disenfranchised groups and classes; the hundreds of 
thousands of Nepalese who joined the ‘people’s movement’ in April 2006 to call for peace 
and democracy - not only in Kathmandu but also in other districts – reflected such structural 
change. An enthusiastic Indian observer put it this way: 
 
Even more important [than economic growth], after 1990, development 
spread to the traditionally backward areas outside the Kathmandu Valley, 
which had hitherto concentrated all power in Nepal. Subaltern ethnic and 
tribal groups (Janajatis), religious minorities, and women, experienced an 
improvement in living standards and access to services. All this established 
the substantive relevance of democracy for the people. It enfranchised and 
politicised the disadvantaged strata.34 
 
The demonstration of people’s power was another defining event that brought the peace 
process forward and enabled the Nepalese to credibly claim national ownership of both the 
process and its outcome. The Jana Andolan was a massive and focused expression of political 
will, demonstrated above all when the movement defied much of the international community 
to refuse the King’s initial offer of compromise. Hoping to salvage some of his power, the 
King had on 21 April offered to accept a new nominee for prime minister. India, the US and 
the EU supported his proposal, but when the people’s movement insisted on restoration of the 
Parliament to underline that the legitimacy of the new government should not derive from the 
Palace, the King and the internationals backed down.  
 
As the crisis in Nepalese politics came to a head in 2005-06, the footprint of external 
influences on the diplomacy of peace became more visible. The uncertain and intertwined 
balance in the triangle of King-Maoists-political parties inflated the value of even small shifts 
in international support for one or the other party, and, as a close observer noted, made for 
simple game theoretical calculations. 35 While exploring a rapprochement, the the Maoists 
and the mainstream political parties also suspected that the other would defect from the 
bargain and join the King. The King’s increasing international isolation decreased his 
 
                                                     
32  "Political Transition in Nepal: Toward an Analytical Framework" in Chaitanya Mishra,  Essays on the 
Sociology of Nepal. Kathmandu: Fineprint Books. 2007. Earlier version on http://www.cmi.no/file/?442 
33 While inequality increased, the poor experienced a 22% increase in real incomes in the same period. 
‘That means the bottom 20% not only can afford better food, but also durables such as ‘bicycles, radios 
and mobiles’. Magnus Hatlebakk,  Inclusive Growth in Nepal, p.1. Based on Nepal Living Standards 
Surveys.The most disadvantaged were still hill ethnic Tamang, the Rai people of the eastern hills, 
some hill-Dalits and the Terai (plain) Dalits (ibid).  
http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?3068=inclusive-growth-in-nepal 
34 Praful Bidwai, ‘People triumph in Nepal’, Frontline, Volume 23(9), May 06 - 19, 2006. 
35 As the ICG perceptively noted, ‘[e]ach force’s past conduct and perceived interests will modulate, if not 
determine, the decisions of the other two. None can act independently, yet none can trust the others fully. Given 
this balance of domestic forces, external factors assume great importance.’  Nepal’s New Alliance, op.cit. (note 
25), p. 2.  
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attractiveness as a partner, however, and cemented the bargain between the Maoists and the 
mainstream parties. After the King’s February coup his international isolation was nearly 
complete. The worsening human rights situation prompted the main donors and the UN to 
issue a joint statement on 18 March, warning that the country was moving towards ‘the abyss 
of a humanitarian crisis’. 36 Major donors, including the Swiss and the Norwegians, reduced 
or threatened to cut off aid. As over half of the Nepal’s national budget depended on foreign 
aid, this was a serious matter. Even more significantly, the Indian government decided to cut-
off military aid. Later aid supplies were non-lethal and only included items that were in the 
aid pipeline when the cut-off was announced. Even the outspoken American ambassador in 
Kathmandu cooled his enthusiasm for the King as the last, best bulwark against the Maoists.  
 
As the prospect of an agreement seemed to improve in 2005-06, international efforts to 
support the process increased. “Governments and international NGOs alike …sent in an 
abundance of missions, consultants and advisers who struggled to find a way to make a useful 
contribution,” Teresa Whitfield writes. 37 Donor embassies in Kathmandu sponsored seminars 
and informal dinners to promote the peace process – soon dubbed ‘dinner diplomacy’. A 
Swiss and a South African ‘peace expert’ provided technical assistance to the negotiations 
towards the CPA in 2006.38  UN officials kept up the encouragement and in mid-2005 the UN 
Secretary-General sent a high-ranking advisor, Lakhdar Brahimi, to Kathmandu to explore a 
further UN contribution. The UN also developed fuller communication with all parties to the 
conflict through its human rights field mission established in early 2005. Not all efforts were 
equally welcomed by the Nepalese. In particular, after the messy international support for the 
King’s initial bid to pacify the Jana Andolan in April 2006, ‘the last thing’ the Nepalese 
wanted was ‘high level intervention from the outside,’ Whitfield concludes.39  
3.1 The determinants of national ownership 
The widely accepted view that the 2006 peace agreement was ‘nationally owned’ reflected 
the importance of the domestic forces in shaping the conflict and its gradual resolution 
through the peace process.  This influence was partly a function of national conditions and 
capacities, including established political parties, a vibrant civil society, active media, and a 
distinct sense of nationalism sharpened by the country’s geographic squeeze between two 
huge neighbours. Recognizing the importance of strategic analysis as part of the struggle, the 
Maoists appeared particularly adept in dealing with both local adversaries and international 
friends and foes during the events leading up to the 2006 agreement. 
 
The degree of national ownership of a peace process will also depend on the international 
environment. Countries of little strategic interests to outside powers can more easily assert 
national ownership than societies that are caught in the cross-hairs of international 
competition. One reason for the Nepalese ability to claim a great degree of national 
ownership over both the war and the peace process was that the country had little strategic 
interest to outside powers apart from India and China, and it was tacitly accepted by all 
parties concerned that India here held a preeminent position. The main constraint on Nepalese 
ownership therefore was Indian influence. This had several implications. India did not wish 
other external actors to be significantly involved in the peace process, including the UN. 
While virtually all post-war transitions elsewhere in the world by the early 21st century had 
 
                                                     
36 Cited in Nepal: Dealing with a Human Rights Crisis, ICG, Asia Report No 94, 24 March 2005, p. 1.  
37 Whitfield, op.cit. p. 26. 
38The Swiss participant, Gunther Baechler, describes the process in Nepal : Switzerland's contribution. 
Adapt facilitation to changing context. Role of the external actors, lessons learnt and outlook. Bern: 
Federal Departement of Foreign Affairs FDFA, 2008. http://katalog.alliancesud.ch/German/  
39 Whitfield, loc.cit. 
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been brought within the purview of the expanding UN peacebuilding regime, sometimes in 
ways that undermined national ownership, this did not occur in Nepal. Instead, India was the 
principal external influence that constrained Nepalese ownership of the peace process.  
3.2 India-Nepal relations 
As neighbouring countries that are mutually dependent despite their hugely unequal power, 
India and Nepal have an intrinsically complicated relationship. Although the Maoist People’s 
War and the subsequent peace process created new challenges in the relationship, the Indians 
and the Nepalese responded in ways that were familiar from earlier periods of tension.   
 
Indian policies towards Nepal are rooted in the country’s large power status and the 
ambitions of all post-independence governments to play a leading, and arguably hegemonic, 
role in the subcontinent. For India, security interests relative to China have traditionally been 
paramount, but there are also immediate border security issues, concern over Maoist links 
with revolutionary Naxalite movements in several Indian states, and fear that Pakistan-
supported militant groups may use Nepalese territory for anti-Indian purposes. Movement 
across the long, open border between the two countries is impossible to control, although to 
some extent can be regulated. India also has a range of economic and social interests in 
Nepal, from development of hydropower to welfare payments for Gurkhas who served in the 
Indian army. India’s dominant role is embodied in the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship 
between the two countries. In military matters the treaty is clearly unequal. Reflecting Indian 
fears of Chinese southward expansion, the original treaty (later modified) gave India formal 
oversight over Nepal’s military relations and right to intervene militarily to meet external 
security threats. In economic matters the treaty is formally equal, but reciprocity between two 
highly unequal economies has rebounded in Nepal’s disfavour, as most Nepalese see it, by 
privileging Indian capital and manpower in Nepal.  
 
India has historically used a range of political tactics to promote its interest in Nepal: openly 
coercive measures such as the economic blockade in 1989-90 have been relatively rare. 
Support for one Nepalese political faction against another in a manner that Nepalese usually 
identify as a divide-and-rule strategy has been a fairly consistent feature since Indian 
independence.40  In 1950 and 1951 Delhi supported the King and the Nepali Congress against 
the Rana-establishment that for generations had usurped power from the King. In the 1960s, 
official India supported the political parties against the (next) King Mahendra. In the 1970s, 
support switched to the (next) King Birendra and the Nepali Congress against the Communist 
party.41   
 
India also has a more direct leverage through the traditionally close relationship between the 
armies of the two countries. The original and most onerous clauses of the 1950 treaty that 
permitted Indian control over the Nepal Army were modified in the 1960s (mostly due to the 
efforts of the King Mahendra, whom the Indians then tried to undermine), but Delhi still 
wants India to be the primary source of military assistance to Nepal, in particular to the 
exclusion of Pakistan and China.  When the Nepal Army retooled to deal with the Maoist 
insurgency, India was its main partner. The close relationship between the two armies is 
expressed in honorary joint appointments: the chief of the Indian army is honorary general in 
the Nepal Army and vice versa. The inter-army relationship gives India significant influence 
on matters of both war and peace, as exemplified during the political demise of the Nepalese 
 
                                                     
40 Rabindra Mishra, “India’s Role in Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency,” Asian Survey, vol. 44(5), September-October 
2004, pp. 627-646. For a Nepali nationalist perspective on Indian strategies, see.g. Saubhagya Shah, :A Himalayan 
Red Herrring?” in Hunt, op.cit. 
41 S.D. Muni, India and Nepal, Delhi: Konark, 1995. 
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monarch in 2005-06 when Indian termination of military aid made it clear that Delhi was 
ready to jettison the King if he became overtly nationalistic.  
 
Yet even highly unequal relationships confer some power on the weaker party. India’s many 
interests in Nepal benefit from having good relations with Kathmandu, and Delhi recognizes 
Nepalese sensitivities and fears of being ‘swallowed’ by their large neighbour (as to various 
degrees Sikkim and Bhutan have been). Nepalese willingness to ‘play the China card’ - as 
several Nepalese leaders in fact have done – is a potential constraining factor on Indian 
heavy-handedness.42 In matters of development assistance, moreover, the Nepalese 
government has numerous other partners. During the Maoist insurgency, the government 
concluded military assistance agreements with the UK and the US and received non-lethal 
military equipment from China as well. Within India, political differences at the Centre and 
considerable policy autonomy on the state level further makes it difficult to harness the 
country’s vast power differential vis-à-vis Nepal into a precise policy instrument.   
 
These contextual and historical factors shaped India-Nepal relations during the insurgency 
and the peace process. In deference to Nepalese sensitivities, Indian power was rarely 
displayed openly and at times appeared incoherent, yet it lay as a constant shadow over 
Nepalese politics - a constitutive power that set boundaries and constrained choices.  
 
The Indian government viewed the Maoist insurgency as a national security issue for two 
reasons. First, it was feared that the Nepalese Maoists might inspire or support similar 
movements in India. At the time, the ideologically related Naxalite rebels in northeast India 
posed a significant challenge, ranking just behind militant Muslim groups and the Jammu and 
Kashmir conflict as an internal security threat.43 Second, the China factor was kept alive by 
memories of Chinese expansion into Tibet, the 1962 war between India and China, and 
continuous rivalry between two large powers. Although the Chinese government had 
markedly distanced itself from the Nepalese Maoists, Delhi found its national security 
interests best served by what became known as ‘the two-pillar policy’ of support for Nepal’s 
monarchy and multiparty democracy. Hindu fundamentalist parties in India, especially the 
BJP which led the government until the 2004 elections, were ideologically committed to the 
Nepalese King as the last ruling Hindu monarch in the world. Delhi therefore steadily 
supported the King, his army and the mainstream political parties, yet – perhaps in the logic 
of divide-and-rule – almost all top-level Maoist leaders enjoyed de facto sanctuary in India.  
 
By mid-2004, there were signs of a change. The Prime Minister of the new Congress-led 
coalition government, Manmohan Singh - known for his reasoned and measured political 
approach –encouraged Indian intermediaries to establish back-channel contacts with the 
Maoists to see if the rebels could be tamed through negotiations rather than defeated in 
battle.44 The back-channel initiative laid the foundation for a significant Indian role in 
facilitating negotiations the following year when the King’s coup in February 2005 caused a 
serious crack in the two-pillar policy. The Indian External Affairs’ Minister, Natwar Singh, 
openly chided the King: “This can only benefit the forces that not only wish to undermine 
democracy in Nepal but the institution of democracy as well".45 The Times of India, known to 
be close to the government, referred to the Nepal Army as ‘a ragtag army’ and, in the same 
breath, called King Gyanendra the king of a ‘failing state’.46 Evidently, it was time for the 
 
                                                     
42 King Mahendra’s decision to build a road from Kathmandu to the Tibetan/Chinese border was an early and 
blatant demonstration of this tactic. 
43 Rita Manchanda, “Nepal at a Crossroads,” Frontline, vol. 21 (19), September 11-24, 2004. 
44 Using the Indian scholar S.D. Muni as an intermediary. Whitfield, op.cit.   
45 Statement to the Indian parliament, 4 March 2005, cited in ICG, March 2005, op.cit.,p.1. 
46 Times of India, 13 July 2005. Three months earlier, however, the paper had noted that the military establishment 
was worried about China, and it was much too early to drop the King. 
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Indian government to spread the risk by encouraging negotiations with the Maoists, as 
Manmohan Singh earlier had explored, or even align itself with the forces of democracy and 
social progress in Nepal, as some Indian analysts argued.47 Delhi now switched to support the 
mainstream parties and the Maoists against the King, although privileging the relationship 
with one party (the Nepali Congress), while the Indian security establishment and the Hindu 
fundamentalist parties continued to stand by the army and the King.  
 
The change in Delhi’s policy was a significant encouragement for the Maoists and the 
mainstream parties to negotiate the 12-point roadmap. The key talks even took place in Delhi, 
and the Maoist leader, Prachanda and the Nepali Congress leader and ex-Prime Minister G.P. 
Koirala met in the Indian capital in July 2005. However, the Indian government did not 
openly host the talks, and the extent of direct Indian facilitation is unclear. The Indian 
government placed a near black-out on news of the talks, and later investigations by two 
analysts failed to uncover significant information.48 Delhi’s discretion reflected Nepalese 
sensitivities; an overt Indian hand would have undermined the legitimacy of the agreement, 
which was announced in Kathmandu. Even so, there was some nationalist sniping in 
Kathmandu to the effect that the 12-point Understanding was ‘made in India’.  
 
The relationship was tested at later points in the peace process, but India basically recognized 
that the monarchy was a spent force. The Nepalese people’s movement in April 2006 defied 
Indian attempts to secure acceptance for an interim government appointed by the King (rather 
than the parliament he had dismissed). Importantly, the massive demonstrations in 
Kathmandu that month proceeded without interference from the Nepalese Army and, 
implicitly, the Indian government. The troops were deployed in the background and did not 
disband or stop the demonstrators. Among the many restraints acting on the troops at that 
time – the power of the people, the increasing illegitimacy of the King, the hopes attached to 
the peace process, and the near-united international presence - was also the realization in 
Delhi that it was too late to save the King. 
 
Recognizing the strategic importance of the shifts in India’s policy, the Maoists had early 
started to cultivate Indian support despite their ideological stance that identified India as the 
principal imperialist and neo-colonial enemy. The Maoist struggle for social and economic 
justice was also presented as a nationalist struggle against India - India as the architect of 
unequal treaties, as the main supporter of Nepal’s feudal and monarchical institutions, and as 
the main source of the capital and entrepreneurs that fuelled Nepal’s capitalism. Whether a 
genuine fear or a ploy, Prachanda had called on the revolutionary forces to prepare for an 
Indian military intervention and ordered cadres to dig tunnels for defence. But, as Prachanda 
said, ‘ours is not a dogmatic party’,49 and this was clearly a time for adjustment. In two wide-
ranging interviews with Indian journalists, in September 2005 and February 2006, Prachanda 
noted that the Maoists ‘only’ asked for India not to arm the King’s army, to support the 
democratic forces in Nepal, and to release Maoists leaders still languishing in Indian jails.50 
In return, he emphasized that the Maoists were not attempting to export revolution to India. 
‘People’s war is not a commodity for export.’ There was no ‘compact revolutionary zone’ 
stretching from Nepal into Naxalite territory in India. On the contrary, he said, by 
demonstrating their willingness to negotiate, the Nepalese Maoists could serve as a model for 
 
                                                     
47 E.g,  the frequent and generally sympathetic reports by Rita Manchanda in Frontline magazine of the  liberal 
The Hindu. See also  Praful Bidwai, “People Triumph in Nepal,” Frontline, 23(09), May 6-19, 2006. The noted 
Indian scholar of Nepali affairs, S.D. Muni, concluded that continued Indian support for the King after 
Gyanendra’s February 2005 coup was “untenable” (“Neighbourly Concerns”, seminar paper. www.india-
seminar.com/2005/548/548%20s%20d%20muni.htm) and later called for acceptance of the Maoist government 
(“Dealing with a new Nepal,” The Hindu 15, Septem ber 2008).  
48 Whitfield, op.cit., and ICG, November 2005 report, op.cit., pp. 16-17. 
49 Times of India, September 13, 2005 
50 Times of India, 13 September 2005, The Hindu February 2006 (see note 9). 
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the Indian Naxalites to join ‘the new peaceful political stream’. While there was still a need to 
negotiate ‘fresh and equal’ treaties with India, Prachanda mentioned this only in passing.  
 
Prachanda also took pains to assuage Indian concerns regarding the role of outside actors in 
general, not only with regard to China,51 but also in the peace negotiations that were nearing a 
final agreement. Earlier references to the UN by the Maoists had been a sore point in Delhi, 
as we shall see, but now Prachanda emphasized that the reference to UN supervision in the 
12-point Understanding did not mean foreign peacekeepers, only ‘non-armed supervision’.   
4. The UN role: defining a minimalist mission 
The UN mandate to assist Nepal’s transition from war to peace was negotiated with the 
Nepalese parties during the fall of 2006.52 As subsequently approved by the Security Council 
(Res. 1740/2007), the UN had four main functions in relation to the implementation of the 
peace agreement: 
 
First, the UN was asked to verify and monitor cantonment of both the Maoist and the Nepal 
Army and their arms. The peace agreement is quite specific on cantonment details and 
technicalities of monitoring; these were further elaborated in a separate technical agreement 
on monitoring and management (the AMMAA), signed a week later. The main principles for 
supervision are set out in the preamble of the AMAA: 
 
The parties agree to seek UN assistance in monitoring the management of the 
arms and armies of both sides by the deployment of qualified UN civilian 
personnel to monitor, according to international norms, the confinement of 
Maoist army combatants and their weapons within designated cantonment 
areas and monitor the Nepal Army (NA) to ensure that it remains in its 
barracks and its weapons are not used against any side.53  
 
Neither the CPA nor the technical agreement specifies the period of UN supervision of arms 
and armies.54 The peace agreement operates with two benchmark events – elections to a 
constituent assembly and ‘the democratic restructuring of the army’ – but these are only 
mentioned in a general sense to introduce and justify the provisions for international 
monitoring. The technical agreement makes reference to a set of much broader benchmarks – 
including ‘democratic restructuring of the state, and social-economic-cultural transformation’ 
- but does not tie the duration of UN arms monitoring to these or any other event. It was 
assumed, and non-controversial, that UN presence would cover the election period; this had 
all along been the principal reason cited by the Nepalese parties and the UN Secretary-
 
                                                     
51 In the Times of India interview, Prachanda welcomed the Indian Foreign Secretary’s recent visit to Beijing and 
the prospect of a Sino-Indian agreement on Nepal – implying that the Maoists would be happy to relinquish the 
opportunity to play ‘the China card’. 
52 The initial negotiations took place in August-September 2006 with reference to two identically worded letters 
requesting assistance sent to the UN Secretary-General by the Nepali Congress leader and then Prime Minister, 
G.P.Koirala and Prachanda in August. The terms were further developed with reference to the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in November that year and the related Agreement on Monitoring of the 
Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA).52   
53 Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies 28 November 2006, preamble. 
54 An outside consultant identified this as a weakness. Major General (Ret.) Michael Smith, Unfinished Business: 
Preliminary Lessons from United Nations Arms Monitoring in Nepal, 27 June 2008 (CPPF, Social Science 
Research Council), p. 11. 
CMI WORKING PAPER UN SUPPORT FOR PEACEBUILDING: NEPAL AS THE EXCEPTIONAL CASE WP 2009: 7 
 
 15 
General for inviting the UN.55 The open-ended nature of the UN monitoring presence, 
however, compounded the delicate negotiations that took place when the mission’s mandate 
was periodically renewed.  
 
The second core function of the UN mission was to monitor and assist the forthcoming 
elections. Constituent assembly elections had been a critical element in the negotiations and 
formed the principal bridge to competitive but peaceful, multiparty politics. The Nepalese 
parties had originally requested the UN to ‘observe’ the elections, but as the UN itself does 
not do large-scale election observation, its role was defined in terms of technical assistance to 
the elections and a monitoring role organized around a small, independent Electoral 
Assistance Office. In the UN perspective, the organization’s major role in contributing to 
optimal conditions during the elections would be to maximize UN presence in the districts. 
This was done through the posting of UN civil affairs officers and electoral advisers to the 
districts, as well as through the presence of human rights officers from UNOHCHR, and 
encouragement of external election observers from appropriate NGOs. This rationale led to a 
far-flung and visible UN presence throughout Nepal in preparation for the elections. At its 
height, the civilian UNMIN component alone totaled almost 700 civilians, half of whom were 
internationals. Election assistance was a staple of international peace missions and in the 
Nepal case played an important role in the transition from war to peace. Yet the UN’s high 
visibility also had a cost, as we shall see below, in terms of negative Nepalese reaction to the 
‘white vehicles’ syndrome. 
 
A third function for UNMIN approved by the Security Council was to assistant in the 
monitoring of the ceasefire agreement. This was the primary basis for justifying the civil 
affairs component of the mission. 
 
The peace agreement has another reference to the UN, namely the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The OHCHR is requested to maintain the field 
mission it established in Nepal in 2005 and to monitor the sweeping human rights provisions 
of the peace agreement. The initial decision to establish the field mission had been highly 
controversial, but once in operation the mission rapidly demonstrated its value. Its continued 
presence in the pecebuilding phase was readily affirmed, although organizationally it 
remained a separate entity when UNMIN was established. 
 
In sum, the operation approved by the Security Council on January 23, 2007 was a ‘focused 
mission of limited duration’, as it came to be called. Unlike most contemporary UN peace 
missions, there were no armed peacekeepers. UNMIN personnel observing the cease fire and 
the two armies were to be unarmed and civilian (at least in appearance).. There were no 
provisions for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction, and none for broader 
peacebuilding functions in the legal, political and social field.  
 
The mandate was even narrower than what the UN Secretariat had proposed in its reports to 
the Security Council. Based on UN assessment missions in the fall of 2006 and the advice of 
the newly appointed Personal Representative of the Secretary-General (PRSG) to Nepal, Ian 
Martin, the Secretary-General had outlined a somewhat broader role. It was envisaged the 
 
                                                     
55 The ‘United Nations has been requested to monitor the arrangements relevant to the management of 
arms and armed personnel…. Assistance is being sought in a variety of areas in the peace process with 
a view to creating an atmosphere conducive to free and fair elections for the Constituent Assembly.’ 
Letter dated 22 November 2006 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council. 
S/2006/920, 27 November 2006, p.1. The letters from G.P. Koirala and Prachanda are appended to the 
document. The 8-point agreement between the Maoists and the government of 16June 2006 
specifically refers to UN supervision of the two armies before and during the constituent assembly 
elections. 
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mission would be ‘providing good offices to the Nepalese parties and authorities at all 
levels’.56 Furthermore, ‘[i]in support of the mission’s good offices and political functions, the 
unit will have adequate capacity to monitor, analyse and report on political, civil, social and 
economic and other relevant issues.’57 The term ‘good offices’ did not make it into the 
authorizing resolution for UNMIN. Although this function arguably was inherent in any UN 
peace operation, as Martin indeed maintained, he later sought to develop the formal basis for 
a more active role in this regard and regretted that  mandate did not explicitly permit UNMIN 
to provide ‘broader support’ to the peace process.58 The Secretariat in its original report had 
also suggested a general  peacebuilding role that included support to local governance 
structures, conflict resolution on the local and national level, and posting of ‘social exclusion 
advisers’ to the countryside to promote the rights of women, children and traditionally 
marginalized groups.59 This was pared down to a standard one-liner item in the introduction 
to the mandate approved by the Security Council: “Recognizing the need to pay special 
attention to the needs of women, children and traditionally marginalized groups in the peace 
process, as mentioned in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement” etc. The discrepancy 
reflected in part the different nature of the two documents. A background report 
recommending a mission is typically a fuller document than the mandate as formulated in a 
Security Council resolution. When established, UNMIN did include thematic advisors on 
gender, child protection and social inclusion, as well as a sizable number of civil affairs 
officers who looked after ‘critical peace process issues’ as well as the election.60 But the 
mission as a whole started to downsize soon after the 2008 elections and by early 2009, only 
two years after it was established, UNMIN had been sharply reduced in both size and formal 
status.61  
4.1 The rationale for ‘a focused mission of limited duration’ 
As none of the major actors wanted more than a minimalist mission, the UN Secretariat never 
considered a full-fledged, multidimensional operation. The rationale for a  more minimalist 
operation was persuasive. The Nepalese had painstakingly negotiated for more than 3 years to 
reach an agreement. Although some political factions in the Terai later complained that they 
were not included, at the time the agreement involved the main parties to the civil war and 
had the support of all the organized political actors - the main political parties, civil society 
organizations, neighboring states and the main donors. The armed forces on both sides were 
for the most part disciplined and well-established, not ‘rag-tag armies’ of warlords or militias 
with diffuse leadership structures. Nepal was not a failed state in the usual meaning of the 
 
                                                     
56 Report of the Secretary-General on the request of Nepal for United Nations assistance in support of its peace 
process.  S/2007/7, January 9, 2007, para. 47. 
57 Ibid.para. 53. 
58  In his last briefing to the Security Council in early, 2009, Ian Martin said his one particular regret was that UN 
offers to provide broader support to the peace process were not accepted. Briefing, 16 January 2009, 
www.unmin.org.ne 
59‘[T]the mission will have a civil affairs component including officers deployed to the regions…. 
 The civil affairs officers will seek to promote the strengthening of the democratic functioning of local governance 
structures and the freedom of all political parties to operate normally throughout the country, working closely with 
local government and civil society to develop and promote conflict mitigation and dispute resolution strategies at 
the local level. Gender, child protection and social exclusion advisers will ensure that the work of the civil affairs 
officers, as well as of the monitors of management of arms and armies and of the electoral staff, maximize the 
inclusion of women and traditionally marginalized groups.’ S/2007/7, para.46. 
60 Report of the Secretary-General on the request of Nepal for United Nations Assistance in support of its peace 
process. S/2007/612, 18 October 2007, p. 9 
61 The mission head was no longer a Special Representative of the Secretary-General, but had the lower rank of a 
Representative of the Secretary-General. 
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word.62 On the contrary, the country had at least until the war had state administration that 
functioning relatively well despite its politically and socially exclusive nature. Years of 
dealing with donors had created national procedures and international confidence in the 
capacity of the state to handle funds for reconstruction. It was symptomatic that the multi-
donor trust fund established for post-war reconstruction in 2007 was administered by the 
Nepalese government and not an international financial institution on behalf of the donors, as 
was the norm in genuinely failed states such as Afghanistan. The issue in Nepal was less the 
lack of a state apparatus than who should control the state.  
 
As for reconstruction, the 10-year civil war had directly or indirectly touched the lives of 
most of the 28 million Nepalese. Some 15 000 had been killed or made to disappear, and 
many more thousands had been forced to leave their homes.63 Yet not all regions of the 
country had been affected, and certainly not all in equal measure, and the economy as a 
whole had continued to grow during the ten-year war.64  Comparatively speaking, this was a 
‘small war’ alongside other conflicts where the UN was or had been involved, such as 
Afghanistan, Congo, and the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, several foreign donors had long 
been active in Nepal, and most had maintained their activities, if abridged, during the war. 
The UN programs and specialized agencies were there as well. In short, the machinery and 
funding circuits for reconstruction were already in place.  
 
This augured well for the implementation of the peace agreement with even a minimalist UN 
mission. None of the main Nepalese parties to the conflict seemed seem to want a fuller 
presence, although the Maoists were more welcoming towards the UN than the mainstream 
parties, both during the peace negotiations and in the peace implementation phase.  
4.2 The Nepalese parties 
For the Maoists, the UN represented above all a potential source of international recognition 
and support. All rebels start the battle of international legitimacy with a huge handicap in 
relation to the government. As custodian of the nation’s sovereignty, the government is 
entitled to a place in the dense international web of communication, assistance and diplomacy 
 
                                                     
62  The ‘failed states’ literature is vast. A first generation of important but now rarely cited works are William 
Zartman, (ed.), Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Boulder; Lynne 
Rienner, 1995; Joel S.Migdal, J.S., Strong Societies and Weak States. State Relations and State Capabilities in the 
Third World, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988. For “failed states’ in relation to terrorism, see Gurr, 
T.R., et al., State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings, September 30, 2000 (anticipating some of the 
post 9/11 perspectives), and  Robert I. Rotberg, R.I., Failed States in a World of Terror, in: Foreign Affairs, vol. 
81 n° 4, 2002, pp. 127-140. Basic concepts are sorted out in Jennifer Milliken (ed.). State failure, collapse and 
reconstruction. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publ 2003. (Book Version of a special issue of Development and 
Change, vol.33(5),2002, ed. with K. Krause). A useful overview of the aid-related literature, including 
OECD/DAC efforts to harmonize aid towards fragile/failed states, is Torunn Wimpelmann, The Aid Agencies and 
the Fragile States Agenda, Working Paper no 21, 2006, Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute 
http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?2542=the-aid-agencies-and-the-fragile-states-agenda .A 
good overview of the literature on ‘failed states’ in Africa is Timothy Raeymaekers Collapse or Order? 
Questioning State Collapse in Africa, Working Paper N° 1 May 2005, University of Gent, Conflict Research 
Group, http://www.psw.ugent.be/crg/publications/working%20paper/QuestioningStateCollapse.pdf. 
Two recent publications suggest the span in the literature: Robert Bates, When Things Fall Apart: State Failure in 
Late-Century Africa, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008 (analysis anchored in rationalist theory), and 
Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart ,Fixing failed states : a framework for rebuilding a fractured world. Oxford : 
Oxford University Press, 2008 (a how-to guide for fixers of failed states). 
63 Human Rights Watch, Waiting for Justice. Unpunished Crimes from Nepal’s Armed Conflict, September 2008, 
citing the Nepali human rights organization INSEC say 13 256 persons were killed, and close to 2000 
“disappeared”, mostly at the hands of the army and armed police. 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nepal0908web_0.pdf 
64 Hatlebakk, op.cit. 
CMI WORKING PAPER UN SUPPORT FOR PEACEBUILDING: NEPAL AS THE EXCEPTIONAL CASE WP 2009: 7 
 
 18 
as well as the measure of international legitimacy that recognition confers.65   Rebels, by 
comparison, must actively seek out international patrons. During the Cold War, state patrons 
were readily available to rebels on the ideological left and right, but after 1989 such 
patronage dried up, particularly for a fledgling Maoist movement. China, for one, kept to a 
strictly correct line of maintaining relations with the Nepalese government, not the rebels, and 
seemed somewhat embarrassed that Chairman Mao’s name was appropriated by the Nepalese 
insurgents.  
 
As noted above, the only international support network of the Nepalese Maoists was a 
smattering of militant leftist movements, mainly in India (Naxalite groups and various 
‘national liberation fronts’ in India’s northeast.).66 Outside the subcontinent, they had ties 
with radical splinter groups in South Asia, Latin America and Middle East, and some groups 
in Europe and the United States whose names (‘revolutionary communist’) indicated their 
marginal status in this part of the world.  Some of the movements were joined in umbrella 
organizations, of which the two main ones were RIM (Revolutionary Internationalist 
Movements) and CCOMPOSA (Coordinating Committee of the Maoist Parties and 
Organizations in South Asia). As struggling splinter movements, the most these organizations 
could offer was solidarity and the lessons learnt from their own experience.67 More tangible 
support in the form of donations/taxes was collected from individuals and businesses within 
the country and from among the many Nepalese working abroad. Yet it could not make up for 
the movement’s international isolation. The point was brought home when the Deuba 
government in late 2001 declared an emergency and listed the leaders as fugitive criminals 
under Interpol. Later on, even exile in India became uncertain when Indian police in 2003-4 
arrested several high-ranking Maoist cadres.  
 
Making a virtue of necessity, Prachanda stressed the importance of self-reliance. The Maoists 
nevertheless recognized the importance of international publicity to the People’s War. For 
example, they invited a British journalist to witness the establishment of the first ‘people’s 
government’ in the central region close to Kathmandu and were rewarded with a full-feature 
friendly report in the Sunday edition of the Independent. Importantly, the Nepalese press 
made much of the fact that the international press had been present, seeing it as a propaganda 
victory for the Maoists.68 During the negotiating phases of the conflict, the party leadership 
made a point of presenting their positions to the diplomatic missions in Kathmandu 69  
 
The Maoist decision to welcome the UN into the peace process must be seen in this light. It 
helped in some ways to correct the initial imbalance between government and rebels. By its 
very act of dealing with the insurgents, the UN conferred a measure of status and reduced 
their isolation. The UN was also useful to the Maoists as a witness in the negotiations, a 
political guarantee of security when they moved into the open, and a friendly broker when the 
peace agreement was signed but implementation faltered.  
 
 
                                                     
65 Doctrines of diplomatic recognition in international law differ. The pragmatic tradition denies that diplomatic 
recognition confers (political) legitimacy.  
66  www.cpnm.org and Nepal’s Maoists: Purists or Pragmatists? ICG, Asia Report N°132, 18 May 2007. 
67 From the RIM Committee, the party shared the distilled experiences of revolutionary communist movements in 
Peru, Turkey, Iran and the Philippines,   It was rumoured that Pakistan intelligence agency ISI had approached the 
Maoists with offers of assistance, but the Maoists recognized the danger this posed to their delicate relationship 
with India, and Prachanda firmly denied the rumours. Anirban Roy, op.cit. 96. 
68 Sarah Shneiderman and Mark Turin,” 'The Path to. 'Janasarkar': An Anecdotal Account of the Maoist 
Movement in Dolakha District”, in Hunt, op.cit. . 80. 
69 For instance, when the 2001 talks broke down the party sent a letter to foreign embassies in Kathmandu which 
placed the blame on the unwillingness of the government to accept a constitutional assembly. When the Maoists 
came to Kathmandu for the 2003 talks, they made a point of keeping in touch with the diplomatic community. 
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Nevertheless, the Maoists did not rush to invite in the UN. Their appreciation of the potential 
value of the UN developed over time and always recognised its limits. The idea of UN 
assistance to mediate an end to the civil war did not originate in Nepal, but in the UN 
Secretariat, apparently with the aid of a high-ranking official in UNICEF who himself was 
Nepalese.70 The four-line offer to mediate (provide ‘good offices’, in UN language) was 
initially buried in the annual report of the Secretary-General’s to the General Assembly on 
the work of the organization in August 2002.71 The offer went unnoticed until picked up by 
the Indian and Nepalese press in connection with the marking of the UN Day on 24 October 
the same year. This might have sparked the interests of the Maoist leadership, as one recent 
study claims,72 but, if so, they did not let it be known. Not until February 2004 – more than a 
year and half later - did Prachanda respond positively. Acknowledging offers from the UN 
and the EU to help move the peace process forward, he said the Maoists ‘would accept 
mediation and observation from the UN towards creating an environment for solving the 
conflict peacefully.’73 The response opened for a renewed offer from the Secretary-General in 
March 2004, and now Prachanda accepted. By this time, as we have seen, the military 
stalemate between the PLA and the RNA was starting to hurt, and Maoists were again 
considering talks.  
 
As the peace process moved forward, the most direct value of the UN for the Maoists was to 
monitor the two armies during the transition period. As we have seen, this enabled the 
Maoists to postpone demobilization until after the constituent assembly elections. In a more 
general sense, UN commitment to help implement the peace agreement also gave a UN 
imprimatur to its key principles for which the Maoists had fought – an elected constituent 
assembly, restructuring of the state, social inclusion, the end of ‘autocratic monarchy’ and on 
the horizon, a republic. When implementation stalled in 2007, the UN presence represented a 
measure of physical protection, Maoist leaders repeatedly told senior UNMIN officials.74 The 
Maoists were now moving openly throughout the country to prepare for elections, but the 
PLA was cantoned. The much larger Nepal Army was also confined to its barracks and 
monitored by the UN, but there were no restrictions on the armed police or the police. The 
UN had neither the capacity nor the mandate to do more than draw a political line in the sand, 
yet the Maoists evidently appreciated its protection value.  
 
The UN presence and its human rights field mission arguably helped to inhibit some forms of 
violence by the ex-belligerents, yet it did not prevent the low-level violence that developed 
soon after the CPA was signed and led to a condition of lawlessness in parts of the country, 
especially the Terai. Operating mostly outside the Terai, the Maoist Young Communist 
League soon became notorious for kidnapping, beating and otherwise intimidating political 
opponents.  Most egregiously, higher-level Maoist cadres kidnapped a prominent 
businessman who subsequently was tortured and killed in a PLA cantonment site included in 
the UN monitoring scheme. The incident took place in May 2008, just after the Constituent 
Assembly elections that gave the Maoists a resounding victory. The murder of Hari Ram 
Shrestha became a cause celebre for the mainstream parties, now in opposition, who charged 
the UN of colluding with the Maoists. UNMIN must go!” declared one paper, in language 
only slightly more brash than that in the mainstream media. The failure of the UN to stop the 
murder, the editorial continued, “gives credence to the general presumption in Nepal that the 
 
                                                     
70 Kul Chandra Gautam. 
71The operative paragraph read: “In Nepal, however, I am increasingly concerned by the escalation of 
violence between the Government and the armed insurgency. If requested, I would positively consider 
the use of my good offices to help achieve a peaceful solution.”  Report of the Secretary-General on 
the work of the Organization. Supplement No. 1.A/57/1, August 28, 2002, pra 25. 
72 Whitfield, op.cit. p.13.  
73 Kathmandu Post, 5 February 2004. 
74 Interviews with present and former, UMIN officials, October and December 2008. 
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UNMIN officials are friendly towards the Maoists and that the authorities there only pocket 
money for their non-performances and high negligence as well.”75 
 
In fact, the mainstream parties needed the UN as much as the Maoists in order to conclude 
the deal on elections and monitoring of the two armies that was necessary to secure a peace 
agreement. Yet the largest of them, the leader of the Seven Party Alliance and the main 
negotiating partner, the Nepali Congress, on occasion openly questioned impartiality and 
value of the UN. Underlying the reservation and at times outright hostility was resentment 
that the UN involvement in the peace procession necessarily had conferred some status on the 
Maoists as an equal and legitimate political partner. Even a simple act of representation, such 
as the presence of a high-ranking UN official at a celebration parade by the PLA, underlined 
that the Maoist army now was a legitimate body and provoked protests from the Nepali 
Congress.76 When the Maoists unexpectedly won the Constituent Assembly elections in April 
2008, the mainstream parties, particularly the Nepali Congress, vented their anger at the UN.  
The Nepali Congress had signed the peace agreement on behalf of the Seven Party Alliance 
in the firm expectation that they would win the elections, and for that reason had welcomed 
the UN to monitor the results.  On the eve of the elections the mainstream parties had 
confidently circulated estimates predicting that the Maoists would get only 10-15 % of the 
vote (they got 29% and ended up as the largest single party in the Assembly with 38% of the 
seats).77 The crushing loss made the mainstream parties seize on matters small and large, 
including the alleged unauthorized movement of Maoist cadres and arms during the elections 
and the murder of Ram Hari Shrestha, to criticize the UN. The Nepali Congress, the only, 
large mainstream parties to choose opposition rather than joining the Maoist-led coalition 
after the elections, was particularly testy. Hints that the UN might assist with the difficult 
issue of demobilization and integration of the two armies was met with icy rejection, both in 
public and apparently in intra-party discussion as well.78 NC leader G.P. Koirala even 
expressed his anger at the UN in undiplomatic terms to the UN Secretary-General when he 
visited Kathmandu in November 2008.79 
 
National actors commonly assess the value of the UN in a strategic calculus determined by 
their policy objectives, but this tendency seemed particularly pronounced in the Nepal case, 
perhaps because of the sense that the war as well as the peace process was primarily of their 
own doing. All political parties tried to manipulate the UN presence in their own favour or 
circumventing it when inconvenient. Thus, the Maoists – although basically more 
appreciative than the Nepali Congress of the UN–  played the numbers game in the UN-
supervised registration of arms and combatants. They also tried to use the registration process 
as a bargaining leverage on the broader issue of integration of Maoist cadres in the Nepal 
Army. The Nepali Congress had shown a partisan interpretation of the UN’s role from the 
moment when the UN mission to Nepal was being planned.  The then Prime Minister G.P. 
Koirala had sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General in mid-2006 asking for a UN mission to 
 
                                                     
75The Telegraph Nepal, 23 May 2008. http://www. telegraphnepal.com/news_det.php?news_id= 
3466&PHPSESSID=d92eab2de286e52a10b43510f76751ed   
76The problem arose when the head of the UN monitoring mission, General Jan Erik Wilhelmsen attended an 
anniversary parade of the PLA in November 2007. The head of UNMIN and other UN civilian officials declined 
the invitation. Government officials boycotted the ceremony. The nomenclature might have been important here. 
In the peace agreement, the Maoist soliders are referred to as ‘Maoist combatants’ or ‘the Maoist Army’, never the 
People’s Liberation Army. 
77 Interviews with Nepali Congress member, Kathmandu, December 2008. 
78 Interviews with Nepali Congress member, Kathmandu, December 2008. 
79The meeting between Ban Ki-Moon and G.P. Koirala  was widely reported in the Nepali press as 
embarrassing. Koirala seized on an incident where a Maoist member of the Constituent Assembly had 
taken his weapon along to an assembly meeting. As PLA weapons had been registered by the UN in 
the cantonments, Koirala suggested that the UN was responsible for the transgression.  
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decommission the Maoist army. 80  The request had not been discussed with the Maoists and 
was contrary to the basic understanding of the peace talks nearing completion at the time. The 
request contravened the requirement of neutrality attached to a UN peace mission, and on 
which its legitimacy and presumably also influence rest. The Maoists naturally protested, and 
UN officials secured two identical letters from Prachanda and Koirala that omitted the 
offending sentence and requested UN assistance on correctly neutral terms. 
 
The instrumentalist views of the UN were mirrored in Indian policy as well. 
4.3 The Indian factor 
India’s opposition to a strong UN presence in the Nepal peace process was a principal reason 
why UNMIN was designed as a minimalist mission. To some, it was surprising that India 
accepted such a mission at all. The explanation lies in the successful establishment of a prior 
UN mission in Nepal – the human rights field mission introduced in 2005. The OHCHR field 
presence was a turning point in this respect as it breached the general Indian opposition to 
UN involvement in the peace process in Nepal. It is therefore useful to briefly review the 
conditions that led to the establishment of the mission.  
 
In Nepal, the democratic surge in 1990 had again come alive in the neutral and ‘non-political’ 
field of human rights.  Nepalese civil society and human rights advocates, supported by 
international human rights organizations, had long advocated an OHCHR presence to monitor 
the severe human rights abuses during the war. Their efforts had initially met with firm 
opposition from India, the US, the UK and the Nepalese government. The reasons varied. The 
Indian government was generally sceptical to the usefulness of a UN mission in the 
subcontinent and, according to some observers, specifically feared a human rights mission 
might set a precedent for international monitoring in Kashmir, where Indian troops were 
regularly accused of human rights abuses.81 The US government concluded that UN-
monitoring would be exploited by the Maoists and their supporters to discredit the 
government security forces. The UK evidently supported its larger ally in what was cast as a 
front in the ‘war on terror’. The Nepalese government did not want the indignity of having an 
international monitoring agent scrutinize its national armed forces.  
 
The matter was raised at the March 2005 Human Rights Commission session in Geneva, 
which happened to take place just a month after the King’s coup that abolished parliamentary 
democracy and sparked a worsening human rights situation. For the proponents of 
monitoring, the timing was good. Human rights groups in Nepal appealed to the international 
community to appoint a Special Rapporteur for Nepal or a field mission.82 When the Swiss, 
backed by the EU (minus UK) were ready to propose a special rapporteur, India, the US and 
the UK proposed a field mission of the OHCHR, which they thought would be a lesser 
mechanism, and prevailed on the Nepalese government to accept it. The Nepalese 
government had a few months earlier signed an agreement for very limited technical 
assistance with the OHCHCR,  and the resolution that passed in 2005 in favour of a field 
mission seemed rather toothless, only requiring Nepal to accept ‘technical cooperation’.  
 
 
                                                     
802 July 2006 letter by G.P. Koirala.  
 http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/document/papers/Prime_Minister_Koirala_Letter1.htm 
81  Ehtasham Khan, ‘Why India holds key to peace in Nepal,’  
http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/apr/06nepal.htm 
82http://humanrights.palermo.magenta-
aps.dk/upload/application/0d882eed/public_appeal_from_the_nepalese_human_rights_community_5.pdf Public 
Appeal from the Nepalese Human Rights Community, March 15, 2005.  
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If the Nepalese government and its international supporters had thought this would be a non-
intrusive field mission, they were mistaken.83 The High Commissioner, Louise Arbor, had 
negotiated a field mission with a strong mandate, authorizing extensive powers to monitor, 
investigate, advise, issue public reports and communicate with the state as well as the rebels 
in order to address violations and improve the climate for greater respect for human rights. In 
addition to the headquarters office in Kathmandu, the High Commissioner could establish 
sub-offices in the districts at her discretion, although ‘bearing in mind’ the view of the 
government. 84 The first team arrived already in May. The office expanded rapidly and soon 
had regional sub-offices up and reporting.  
 
The Indian government came to accept the OHCHR mission and, as the peace negotiations 
moved towards a conclusion, actively endorsed a limited UN mission as well. In this, it 
seemed, it made another miscalculation.  
 
The premise for Indian support to the peace talks had been that either the Maoists would be 
de-radicalized by having to operate in the political arena, or if not, at least they would lose in 
free and fair elections. Delhi for this reason welcomed UN election assistance to facilitate 
international monitoring and legitimize the results. In this perspective, the more UN presence 
the better. The Indians ‘wanted to plaster the countryside with election monitors,’ a UN 
official later recalled.85 In an unusual measure,  the Indian Ministry of External Affairs  even 
called together foreign diplomats in Delhi in late 2006 to request their support for the UN 
mission in Nepal then being planned in New York.86 When the Nepalese parties later failed to 
agree on the system of election to be adopted, and the Constituent Assembly elections were 
postponed for a second time, the Indian government became visibly nervous. The Indian 
Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran arrived in Kathmandu in November 2007 and publicly 
accused the Maoists of obstructing the process. When the elections finally were held, a high 
level Indian official publicly declared that he hoped the Nepali Congress would win.87 When 
the elections results gave a large victory to the Maoists, the Indians were as shocked as the 
Nepali Congress, the value of the UN as seen in Delhi was deflated accordingly. 
 
Two more mandate issues must be considered before assessing the work of the UN and its 
impact on the peace process. One relates to the absence of peacekeepers in the original 
mandate; the other arose later when efforts were made to strengthen the mandate when the 
peace process seemed to falter and new violent conflicts erupted. 
4.4 No peacekeepers 
Both the Nepalese parties had ruled out an international peacekeeping force from the time 
they started to consider an international mechanism to aid the transition from war to peace. 
The Maoists had been quite clear. ‘No, no foreign troops’, Prachanda told an Indian journalist 
soon after the 12-point agreement was concluded in November 2005.88 Instead, the 
 
                                                     
83 Interview, UN official, December .2008. The Nepalese government and its international supporters 
were not alone. Some criticis in Indian saw the field mission as the weaker mechanism and castigated 
the government for failing to side with the forces of democracy and human rights . Praful Bidwai, 
“India's U-turn on Nepal,” Frontline, vol. 22 (10), May 07 - 20, 2005    
84 Art. VI, Agreement, http://nepal.ohchr.org/en/AboutUs.html Signed in Geneva 8 April and in Kathmandu 10 
April 2005.  
85 Interview, Kathmandu, December 2008. 
86 Interview, Norwegian diplomat, October 2008. 
87 In a television interview, the national security adviser, M.K. Narayanan ‘indiscreetly revealed India’s preference 
for a NC [Nepali Congress] victory’. Rita Manchanda, “Waiting for ‘Naya’ Nepal,” Economic and Political 
Weekly, 19 July 2008, p. 25. 
88 In TheHindu interview, February 2006, op.cit. 
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negotiations settled for UN supervision of the two armies and their armories (9-point 
agreement June 2006). To underline that this was not even a distant relative of a conventional 
blue-helmets operation, both the Nepalese parties specified that the UN monitors must be 
‘qualified civilian personnel’, as Prachanda and G.P. Koirala later put it in their identical 
letters to the UN Secretary-General requesting assistance. 89  
 
The Nepalese insistence on civilian monitors created some headaches in the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York. Finding qualified civilians to manage and 
monitor two recent belligerent armies was in itself difficult. There was also a risk of hostile 
attacks, either a deliberate provocation or a situation spiraling out of control. There was little 
or no precedent for this kind of missions,90 and no standard operating procedures in the 
DPKO for recruiting, deploying, protecting and – if need be – extracting the force. Resistance 
in DPKO eventually gave way as it became clear that it was a question of having a 
monitoring force that would be civilian, at least in appearance, or no force at all. The DPKO 
then settled for ‘monitors with military experience’, and/or ‘active military officers in civilian 
attire’, demanding that the monitors at least must have military knowledge and experience.91 
Always sensitive to form, the Nepalese continued to insist on the term ‘civilian personnel’, 
which was used in the final agreement between Nepal and the UN, although preceded by the 
adjective ‘qualified’. In practice, UNMIN obtained agreement to recruit a majority of serving 
military officers and a minority on leave or retired, who were deployed in civilian attire with 
a blue UN cap. 
 
Why the sensitivity? On the Nepalese side there were several concerns. There was a strong 
sense of national pride. Nepal had a long tradition of providing peacekeepers to the UN – in 
fact, this had been one of the two principal roles of the Nepal Army prior to the insurgency 
(the other was ceremonial functions at the Palace). The prospect of Nepal itself needing 
foreign peacekeepers was disturbing and humiliating, and not only to the army.  Nepal, it was 
broadly understood in the public at large, was a sender of peacekeepers, not a receiver.92 Both 
the Maoists and the Nepal Army recognized that the presence of international peacekeepers 
represented a limitation on their status and a potential constraint on their power and 
movement. While both had agreed to end the civil war, the most difficult issues of 
implementation remained, above all related to the future of the two armies. Moreover, both 
the Maoists and the mainstream parties realized the importance of Indian consent and support 
for the peace process. By 2005, as we have seen, the Maoists were starting to court the Indian 
government. The mainstream parties, particularly the Nepali Congress, had long had a close 
relationship with the India’s Congress Party and considered itself to have privileged access to 
Delhi.  The Indian government, it was clear, opposed a UN peacekeeping force and made the 
point clear to the Nepalese parties during the decisive negotiations on this point. The 8-point 
agreement of June 16, 2006 which specified that the international advisors must be civilian 
was concluded just after G.P. Koirala had been warmly received by high-level officials on a 
visit to Delhi, and Prachanda had consulted with Delhi as well.93  
 
India’s opposition was partly a large power reaction against international peacekeeping 
operations in what it considered its backyard. This was not unusual; there were, for instance, 
military observers but not regular peacekeeping forces in the US ‘backyard’ in Central 
America after the civil wars there in the 1970s and 80s. On the other hand, Washington did 
accept, indeed promoted, a UN force in Haiti, and Russia originally wanted a full UN 
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peacekeeping operation in Georgia in 1993. The Indian position also had a more specific 
explanation, and it was called Kashmir. In the Indian political culture, the UN was 
inextricably bound up with the Kashmir issue, where the Indian official narrative is that India 
had referred the matter to the UN in good faith in connection with the 1947 partition, and 
Nehru had even promised a plebiscite. The move had backfired, however, as the UN had not 
insisted on the prior withdrawal of Pakistani troop from the Pakistan side of the Line of 
Control before plebiscite. Instead, the UN had then and in subsequent years been let itself be 
used by Pakistan and the US to put pressure on India over Kashmir, passing resolutions 
calling for plebiscite  in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir and censoring India for 
moving its troops close to ‘the Pakistani border’. Not until the 1972 could India match the 
unrelenting Pakistan-UN pressure by invoking the Simla agreement with Pakistan, where the 
latter agreed (after a devastating defeat in a war with India) that all bilateral matters should be 
handled bilaterally by the two governments. That seemed to exclude Indian Kashmir from 
UN scrutiny, but the uprising in 1989, which accelerated in the 1990s to plunge the state into 
chaos and violence, generated new concerns in Delhi that it would face pressures to accept 
third party mediation. This could mean losing control over Kashmir and have adverse 
implications for “the distribution of power between and among India’s overlapping 
nationalities” elsewhere in the subcontinent.94  
 
In short, from Delhi’s perspective the UN was at best unruly and unpredictable, at worse, an 
instrument of India’s adversaries. In Nepal, the Indian government came to accept tht the UN 
could perform a useful role in monitoring the elections and related provisions for the two 
armies in a transition period. But international peacekeepers were ruled out as a visible 
limitation on India’ power and a possible precedent for monitoring of development within 
Indian Kashmir.   
4.5 Social exclusion, political inclusion and the thorny issue of mandate 
expansion 
Only a year after the peace agreement had been signed the process became stuck and, it 
seemed, was on the point of derailing. The report issued by the UN Secretariat in October 
2007 detailed the difficulties.95 There was increased violence, particularly in the Terai region 
bordering India’s northeast. Political agitation around identity politics to promote the rights of 
“the Madhesis” (a constructed social category with more recent political significance to 
denote lowland castes in the Terai) rapidly spilled over into armed politics with an overlay of 
criminal activity. By the end of 2007, violence and impunity had become generalized and 
most government officials in the rural areas of the Madhesi districts had deserted their posts. 
Elsewhere law and order was disturbed by bandh, bombs (including in Kathmandu) and 
assassinations, and undermined by the continued failure of the justice system to address grave 
human rights violation committed before the cease-fire took effect.  
 
Politically things were falling apart as well. Elections to the Constituent Assembly had been 
postponed twice. The interim government formed by the Nepali Congress-led coalition and 
the Maoists to jointly manage the transition split apart when the Maoists left in disagreement 
over the election system and the establishment of the republic. There were difficulties in the 
Maoist cantonments - the Nepali Congress Finance Minister refused to pay the salaries of the 
PLA soldiers in the camps, and the Maoists refused to discharge minors (combatants under 18 
years old) who had been identified in a UN verification process.96 There was no progress on 
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the critical issue of dealing with the two armies through partial demobilization, reintegration 
(of Maoist combatants into the Nepal Army), and democratization (of the Nepal Army), 
although both parties had committed to do so according to a procedure identified in the peace 
agreement and affirmed by the Interim Constitution (June 2007). A number of disaffected and 
traditionally marginalized groups – the Madhesi movement in the Terai, the Janajati 
(indigenous) peoples, Dalits (low caste) and women – demanded to be included in the 
negotiations on critical issues relating to the transition. While ‘traditionally marginalized’ 
groups are variously defined, the UN estimated that the Madhesis and Janajatis alone 
constituted over half of Nepal’s total population. 97 In the Terai, as we have seen, demands 
were accompanied by violence against government officials, high caste communities and 
political rivals.98  
 
Underlying these problems was “a deeper gulf of perspective regarding the extent and breadth 
of the political, social and economic changes the country should undergo’, as the UN October 
report noted.99 The peace agreement had raised expectations about greater social justice and 
political inclusion, particularly for traditionally marginalized groups, and to this end 
foreshadowed a restructuring of Nepal’s unitary state in direction of a federal structure. In 
Art. 3.5 of the peace agreement the parties promised in sweeping terms to 
  
address the problems related to women, Dalit, indigenous people, Janajatis, 
Madheshi, oppressed, neglected minorities and the backward by ending 
discrimination based on class, caste, language, sex, culture, religion, and 
region and to restructure the state on the basis of inclusiveness, democracy 
and progression (sic) by ending present centralized and unitary structure of 
the state.  
 
The elections to the Constituent Assembly were the gateway to this comprehensive agenda of 
social and political change. The elections had crystallized the zero-sum nature of politics in 
Nepal, where the power holders were expected to keep a tight rein on the benefits of office, 
and there seemed to be no neutral institutions to mediate the intensely partisan politics.100 All 
parties and politically conscious groups in Nepal’s complex mosaic of caste, class, religion 
and region now positioned themselves for the coming contest. As Ian Martin put it to the 
Kathmandu press in October 2007:  
 
“[T]he process that began very much as a peace process between one 
ideological armed movement, the Maoists, and the State, has become 
complicated by the insistence of traditionally marginalised groups that they 
need to have a central part in a process that is to restructure the State in 
accordance with general commitments to inclusion.”101  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
before the Maoists and the government signed the cease-fire code of conduct.  It was suspected – and soon 
confirmed - that the Maoists had tried to inflate the size of the PLA by signing up additional soldiers just prior to 
the cease-fire.  
97 UN Peace Operations. Year in Review,. New York: UN/ DPKO, p. 38. The term “traditionally marginalized 
groups” is a politically significant category with quasi-legal implications for affirmative action. 
98 John Bevan and Bhaskar Gautam, Political Economy Analysis:The Madhes/Terai, unpublished paper, 
Kathmandu August 2008. 
99 S/2007/612, op.cit.,p.3. 
100 See e.g. Lok Raj Baral, Nepal. Problems of governance. Delhi: Konark, 1993. On the absence of agents to 
mediate and contain conflict in Nepali politics, the journalist Aditya Adhikari writes perceptively that the political 
parties use other institutions such as the bureaucracy, the trade unions and student unions for strictly partisan 
purposes, resulting in “a political process that….is characterized by naked confrontation — in government, on the 
streets and in the House — of social and political forces bent on maximizing their own power at the expense of 
others.” Struggle for survival, Kathmandu Post, 6 July 2009, www.ekantipur.com  
101 Press conference, Kathmandu, 10 October 2007. www.unmin.org.np 
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The most immediate issue was the need to determine the system of elections; the Maoists and 
marginalized groups advocated proportional representation, while most of the mainstream 
parties wanted first-past-the post. More generally, the disaffected groups wanted recognition 
of their demands in the form of principles and agreements that would be included in the 
established political discourse and guide the Constituent Assembly. Thus, the Madhesi 
movement had already in April 2007 secured a commitment to federalism through an 
amendment to the Interim Constitution. In August that year the Madhesis obtained the further 
commitment to ‘regional autonomy’ in a 23-point agreement with the government. In 
Nepalese politics, such agreements typically require constant pressure, vigilance and 
renegotiation, thereby giving the insider a clear advantage. The insiders in the transition 
process toward the new era – the “new” Nepal in Maoist terms - were the established parties 
in the Seven-Party Alliance, led by the Nepali Congress, and the Maoists who had negotiated 
the peace agreement. Their claims to represent the traditionally marginalized groups were 
thin or strongly contested. In the Terai, the most militant Madhesi groups were led by ex-
Maoists who now clashed violently with their erstwhile comrades. The second deep gulf of 
perspective that emerged in 2007 was thus between the insiders in the peace process and the 
outsiders.  
 
UNMIN officials watched developments with a growing sense of concern and helplessness. 
As Martin noted in a careful understatement, events had “made the management of the 
process more complicated.”102 To strengthen his hand Martin returned to the Security Council 
at the end of the year to seek a broader mandate. He wanted explicit backing to mediate in 
both the primary issues identified in the peace agreement (notably relating to the two armies) 
as well as in secondary conflicts arising from demands by disaffected and traditionally 
marginalized groups to be included in the peace process. Concerned about the deteriorating 
security situation, he also wanted a limited UN police presence during the election period. 103 
 
In legal terms, a formal mandate expansion to authorize mediation was probably not 
necessary. A general ‘good offices’ function seemed inherent in the position of the SRSG and 
was implicitly authorized by the original letters from Prachanda and Koirala to the UN in 
August 2006 that requested UN assistance in certain specified areas  “and the entire peace 
process.”104 The additional clause had been inserted on the advice of UN officials who 
thought the mission could need the extra elbowroom, and, on paper at least, the Nepalese 
parties had agreed.  The clause was not, however, explicitly included in the mandate. As for 
the marginalized groups, the Security Council had authorized the mission to “pay special 
attention to the needs of women, children and traditionally marginalized groups in the peace 
process” (Res. 1740/2007). The formulation was sourced to the peace agreement and 
reflected customary conditionality in UN peace operations as well.  
 
However, if UNMIN were to assertively promote a dialogue among the insiders and outsiders 
and mediate among the conflicting perspectives on what the promises of social and political 
inclusion meant in practice, the mission needed strong political backing. Earlier efforts by 
UNMIN in this direction had produced few positive results, but generated considerable 
criticism. Recognizing the tight timeline for elections (originally scheduled for June 2007), 
the mission had from the beginning tried to promote political inclusion of socially excluded 
and traditionally marginalized groups. By September 2007 UNMIN staff totaled almost 700 
civilians, of whom about half were internationals, posted throughout the country to strengthen 
the peace process and prepare for the elections while paying special attention to women and 
traditionally marginalized groups. UNMIN could report back to New York that “the first-ever 
national conference of Madhesi women with representation from over 20 Terai districts” had 
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taken place, as well as several “demonstrations” by the most disadvantaged of the Dalit caste. 
Mindful of Nepalese sensitivities, the UN’s role was described in modest terms (‘participated 
as observers’).105 More controversially, Ian Martin had been talking to a range of Madhesi 
groups to get a sense of their grievances, and staunchly defended his right to do so. “While 
UNMIN has not met or sought to meet with the leadership of armed Madhesi groups,” he told 
the press, “UNMIN has met and will continue to meet with a wide range of representatives of 
traditionally marginalized groups.” 106 
 
It all seemed perfectly legitimate and in line with the requirements of promoting a sustainable 
peace. The official UN narrative put the case succinctly: 
 
UNMIN’s mandate includes paying special attention to the needs of women 
and traditionally marginalized groups, and throughout the year the mission 
advocated strongly for the need for dialogue with these groups as well as for 
an increase in the representation of women in all fields of public life…. 
Ongoing dialogue is essential to ensure their participation in the election for 
the establishment of a truly representative Constituent Assembly where they 
will be properly represented and which is necessary for the restructuring of 
the state that they seek.107 
 
In formal terms, UNMIN’s promotion of dialogue with traditionally marginalized groups 
harmonized with the Nepalese political discourse as well. The language of social, economic 
and democratic inclusion had by this time become a political mantra, embraced officially by 
all political parties, by the just-completed Tenth National Development Plan, by the Election 
Commission, and, as noted, was enshrined in the peace agreement. 
 
To the Nepalese, however, it was a question of ownership. There was a sense that these issues 
and related problems had to be addressed by the Nepalese through the political process. The 
negotiators of the peace agreement had sought UN assistance in the form of technical and 
financial support, and for quite specific purposes. On this fundamental principle, at least, the 
insiders in the peace process seemed to agree. Beyond that, the rationale for a UN role was 
unclear, but the counterarguments were legion. The deep gulf in perspectives on the extent 
and breadth of social change that Martin had referred to made the established castes and 
classes who until now had dominated politics and controlled the state – the Kathmandu 
Valley establishment – fearful of international involvement that would undermine their 
power. In their perspective, the Maoists presented enough of a challenge without the UN and 
the donors also lending their weight to traditionally marginalized groups. Some UN officials 
indeed saw themselves as advocates for the disadvantaged against this establishment.108 But 
even among Nepalese intellectuals, human rights activists and in civil society as a whole 
there was suspicion of UNMIN’s work with marginalized groups. The extraordinarily 
complex social and political make-up of the country raised questions whether outsiders had 
the necessary expertise to make a useful contribution. ‘The question,’ noted a distinguished 
Nepalese sociologist, ‘was and is one of distinguishing between traditionally marginalized 
groups and ‘traditionally marginalized groups’. Could UNMIN validly and sharply 
distinguish between the two?’109  Journalist Aditya Adhikari described the reactions as 
follows: 
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Many of these [UN] individuals had previously worked in places under 
tyrannical governments… and perceived themselves as working for the rights 
of the inhabitants, and against exploitative regimes. Such attitudes were 
carried into Nepal as well, where these officials adopted a simplistic view of 
Nepali politics as solely determined by caste, where a perennially oppressed 
population was pitted against evil Brahiminical elite. For the Nepali political 
class, civil society and media, fiercely proud of the achievements of the 
People’s Movement of April 2006 and subsequent developments, such 
attitudes were patronizing, insufficiently respect of the country’s political 
process and ignorant of Nepali political history. 110 
 
Another Nepalese commentator characterized UNMIN’s positions on social exclusion issues 
as ‘imperial-like’. 
 
UNMIN, from my point of view, was trying to eat what it could not chew. 
The search for broadening of power may still undo its and Nepal’s 
achievements, particularly in relation to the politics of ‘ethnic federalization’. 
Within a broadly democratic set up, the various constituent groups ideally 
negotiate politically; not by means of international organizations.111 
 
As the UN officials fanned out across the countryside, preparing for an election that was 
continuously postponed, reporting on developments to New York but not to the Nepalese, 
and earning good salaries in a poor country, the ‘white vehicle syndrome’ started to appear. 
The UN mission was a visible and easy target for disappointed and angry Nepalese who saw 
the peace process stalling. The limited mandate that the Nepalese had imposed on the mission 
weakened the ability of the UN to influence the speed and direction of the implementation of 
the agreement, for which the UN then was blamed.  
 
Outside its strictly defined mandate, UNMIN could influence the peace process only through 
steady advocacy and careful diplomacy. This the SRSG consistently and patiently did, urging 
the parties to move forward with the electoral process and security sector reform,  implement 
provisions regarding return of property seized during the conflict, strengthen the justice and 
police system, deal with human rights violations and – importantly –  establish a peace 
monitoring mechanism to ensure that commitments made were actually implemented. Yet a 
general advocacy role in relation to peace implementation was not sufficient to create a 
strong constituency for the UN among the political classes. When UNMIN offended powerful 
vested interests by moving into contested areas, no one came forward to offer support.112  
This was essentially what happened when UNMIN asserted its right to do political work 
among the marginalized groups, particularly in the Terai, and which shot down Martin’s 
efforts to secure an expanded mandate from the Security Council. 
 
The Terai was an especially sensitive issue to the Nepalese and the Indian political 
establishment. The Madhesi movement raised the specter of federalism fueled by violence 
and, to some Nepalese, Indian intrigues.113 None of the established parties, including the 
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Maoists, had worked out their position on the nature and criteria of federalism.114 They 
expected to thrash this out over time, probably a long time, in the Constituent Assembly. In 
the meantime, the mainstream parties feared that the UN would at best complicate matters 
and at worse legitimize the Madhesi movement by meeting with their representatives – just as 
the UN by its very presence in the peace process had helped legitimize the Maoists as a 
partner. When Martin defended UN’s s right to meet representatives of the traditionally 
marginalized groups, including the Madhesis, even non-partisan Nepalese observers 
expressed concern. “By suddenly raising the expectations of certain ethnic – or regional – 
groups in a country known for its ethnic diversity, the UNMIN may unwittingly be laying the 
grounds for avoidable conflicts and tensions. The UNMIN thus has to avoid issues that need 
to be sorted out by politicians and voters.”115  
 
Although many Nepalese readily saw an Indian hand behind the unrest in the Terai, the 
Indian government was their strongest de facto ally in efforts to limit the UN’s role in this 
area. Indian officials protested strongly when Martin met with representatives of Madhesi 
groups to listen to their grievances. They protested again when UN officials from the 
humanitarian affairs office (OCHA) talked to militant groups operating in the Terai to protect 
distribution of humanitarian assistance after the flood in the area in late 2007.116 In the Terai 
and beyond, Indian officials saw UNMIN civil and political affairs officers developing 
contacts with Nepal’s political class ‘down to the grassroots’, and protested. “They [UNMIN] 
want to treat Nepal as a UN protectorate, they are going to mess it up”, a senior Indian 
official in Delhi told a well-known Nepalese journalist.117 In terms of the proposed mandate 
expansion, this was where India drew a red line. “Good offices, mediation, facilitation, 
Madesh – it was all out,” as Martin later recalled the message conveyed by the Indian 
ambassador in Kathmandu.118  
 
The mandate issue came at a bad time. Indian frustrations over postponement of the elections 
were mounting, and some officials blamed UNMIN for not putting enough pressure on the 
Maoists. If the UN could not even help to keep the timeline on elections, the mission seemed 
of little use to Delhi. When the Security Council in November was ready to consider the 
extension of UNMIN’s mandate for another six months, it had before it a  ‘a stern message’ 
from the Indian government to the effect that renewal should be subject to downsizing the 
mission and limiting its role. 119 At this point, China was also said to be concerned over the 
sizable and active role of the UN in a country neighboring on Tibet, which in the Chinese 
political lexicon has about the same significance as Kashmir has for India. Neither 
government wished to see a precedent for active UN mediation in conflicts involving 
oppressed or marginalized communities in their part of the world. With opposition or caution 
signaled by two major powers, and no strong advocate for an expanded mandate, it was a 
relatively quick and easy consensus. The Security Council extended the mission for 6 months, 
but with no change in mandate. Downsizing would start after the elections as originally 
envisaged.  
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5. Downsizing 
Elections to the Constituent Assembly were finally held in April 2008, resulting in a surprise 
win for the Maoists who took 38 percent of the seats and formed the government in coalition 
with other parties, including the large and mainstream communist party (UML). Women and 
traditionally marginalized communities also secured unprecedented representation: one-third 
of the elected members were women, and Janajatis, Madhesis and Dalits were represented in 
greater numbers than in any previous parliament and “the considerable overrepresentation of 
historically dominant groups has decreased,” as UNMIN reported to New York.120 It seemed 
a high point in the peace process, and UNMIN started to downsize.  
 
By October 2008, the strength of the mission was less than half of what it had been the 
previous year. The election monitors had gone, of course, as well as some of the personnel 
that had helped position the traditionally marginalized group in the elections. UNMIN’s 
military observers were still in place, although in greatly reduced numbers (only 85, as 
against 182 the previous year). The mandate had been renewed in mid-2008 amid 
speculations that it would be the last time. When the mandate again came up for renewal 
towards the end of the year, the government, now headed by Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal 
Dahal “Prachanda, requested that the mission stay on. The opposition was mounting, 
however. The Nepali Congress - the major mainstream party now in suddenly cast into the 
role of the opposition – was smarting from the humiliating defeat in the elections and 
renewed its attack on the UN. India’s position was known. At the Security Council the 
members were focusing on crises elsewhere in the world. The only permanent member on the 
Security Council to take a special interest in Nepal, the UK favored downsizing. There was a 
sense that the UN had successfully discharged its mandate in Nepal – UNMIN’s presence had 
been partly tied to the elections, which were in the past - and that the peace process was on 
track. While the mandate was renewed, the status of the mission was downgraded. This meant 
that it would be headed by a Representative of the Secretary-General (RSG), rather than as 
previously by a Special Representative of the SG (who has the rank of an Under-secretary 
General). Ian Martin, who had represented the UN continuously since 2005 when he first 
headed the OHCHR mission, left Nepal in January 2009. 
 
At UNMIN, officials maintained that the peace process was quite fragile and that mission was 
important to keep it on track. A mission from the UN Secretariat arriving towards the end of 
the year appeared to agree.121 An independent assessment of the military observers group 
requested by Martin before he left concluded that now was the time to strengthen, not reduce 
the contingent.122 The challenges certainly were legion, as Martin told the Security Council in 
his departure briefing.123Numerous issues arising from the legacy of the war were unresolved 
– known human rights offenders had not be prosecuted, property seized had not been returned 
and, most importantly, the two armies were no closer to being reintegrated, democratized and 
selectively demobilized than when the cease-fire code of conduct had been signed in May 
2006. Almost 20 000 Maoist combatants were remained holed up in their camps, while the 
Nepal Army had started recruiting new soldiers in violation of the peace agreement and the 
related agreement on the management of the armies in the transition period (AMMAA). Two 
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hostile armies whose political representatives could not agree on a way to move forward was 
clearly a considerable threat to the peace. The nature of the peace remained to be defined as 
well. The peace agreement – which was very general in nature – posed major challenges of 
implementation relating to the promised restructuring of the state in the name of social and 
political inclusion. The Constituent Assembly was to address these problems through 
constitution-writing, but all the difficult questions lay ahead. There was no general agreement 
on the criteria for federalism (by ‘ethnicity’, economy, or ‘region?), or the principles for 
optimal decentralization and redistribution of income, and no ready precedent in the modern 
world for peacefully dismantling a unitary state in favour of federalism. In the southeastern 
lowlands of the Terai, armed groups had already mobilized to press their claims.  
 
In this perspective, it seemed an odd time to downsize and downgrade a mission established 
to assist the peace process. Of course, other UN agencies of the UN with specific tasks to 
support the peace process would remain. OHCHR would retain its field mission. UNDP was 
developing a program to assist the constitution process. UNICEF had prepared a program to 
help demobilized Maoist child soldiers. But these agencies lacked the political weight and 
status of UNMIN that flowed from its mandate to monitor critical elements of the peace 
agreement and to assist “in the entire peace process”.  
6. UNMIN’s contribution to peace implementation 
To what extent did UNMIN contribute to consolidate the peace – and by implication, what 
were the opportunity costs of early downsizing? The analysis below considers, first, the areas 
where the mission succeeded in providing what arguably were indispensable contributions to 
the peace process; and, second, areas where the mission tried but failed to shape 
developments. The analysis then returns to the question of the strength and weaknesses of 
national ownership of a peace process. 
 
As the narrative of the peace negotiations has shown, the substantive hurdles in the talks were 
the role of the monarchy, elections to a constituent assembly, and restructuring of the state. 
As the parties neared agreement on these principles, the difficult question remained on how to 
manage the transition from war to peace. The central element was the bargain that permitted 
the Maoists to retain an army during elections, and imposition of some constraints on both 
armies in the period leading up the Constituent Assembly elections. The UN’s most critical 
contribution was to facilitate this transition by monitoring the two militaries and assist in 
creating conditions for a credible election. UNMIN’s role in these respects helped move the 
conflict over the critical hurdle that separated the military from the political arena. Only a 
neutral, third party like the UN could have satisfactorily taken on these functions.  
6.1 Monitoring the militaries 
The UNMIN’s monitoring role in the military sector resembles the concept of “security 
guarantee” as developed by Barbara Walter.124 Walter refers to armed peacekeepers inserted 
between ex-belligerents in order to reduce the security dilemma, i.e. a condition whereby 
both parties strengthen their own position in case the other will defect from the agreement, 
and by doing so create a mutual sense of insecurity that undermines the cease-fire. The 
problem with this argument, of course, is that peacekeepers may not have the mandate or 
capacity to prevent a break-down of the cease-fire, as Stedman has pointed out.125 Still, even 
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in this situation the peacekeepers constitute a trip wire that, if crossed, will trigger some 
disagreeable consequences – the UN Security Council is likely to be involved, mandates may 
be changed, pressure may be mounting to constrain the offender, etc.. Thus, a UN contingent 
with even limited mandate and capacity has some power of deterrence.  In this respect, 
UNMIN’s unarmed observers in mufti and UN-blue caps were not dissimilar from a 
conventional peacekeeping force authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter to maintain 
the peace as per the agreement of the parties concerned.126 In most other respects the observer 
contingent was quite different – it was small, unarmed and without force protection. In the 
arsenal of international peace operations it represented an intriguing innovation. 
 
The UN Arms Monitoring Office (AMO) was based on two principles. The contingent was 
light and it depended upon the cooperation of the belligerent parties.127 After registering the 
arms of the PLA, the observers placed the weapons in locked, central depots. The same 
number of arms from the Nepal Army were similarly decommissioned and deposited. Only 
the two armies had the keys to their respective depots, but the locks were alarmed and under 
electronic surveillance by the AMO observers positioned nearby the depots on a 24 hour 
basis. Restricting access to weapons was one important constraint on the ability of the two 
armies to re-engage in armed conflict or intimidate the population during the election 
campaign. The second major constraint was on the movements of the armies themselves. The 
PLA was cantoned in 7 main sites, each consisting of a cluster of scattered camps built by the 
soldiers. The Nepal Army was confined to their barracks, as per the agreement. Mobile AMO 
teams of international observers visited the 21 Maoist satellite camps and the Nepal Army 
barracks to monitor movements, but did not maintain continuous observation. There was, in 
other words, considerable scope for the parties to cheat.  
 
A high-level tripartite commission was established to deter cheating by reviewing complaints 
and investigate reported violations, and also resolve conflicts. This Joint Monitoring 
Coordination Committee (JMCC) consisted of 9 representatives – 3 from the Maoists, 3 from 
the Nepal Army, and 3 from UNMIN, including the chairman, a Norwegian general who 
headed the contingent. In addition, AMO fielded 10 joint teams consisting of a Maoist and 
Nepalese soldier, who together with an international observer conducted village patrols to 
listen, recommend small development grants, and demonstrate that the PLA and the Nepal 
Army at least on this level were no longer enemies but could actually work together. 
Somewhat misleadingly they were called Joint Monitoring Teams; they did not monitor the 
arms depots or the two armies as the Nepal Army chief did not want a Maoist inside his 
compounds.  
 
This skeletal structure – with peak strength of around 200 persons including Nepalese support 
assistance – was the grand total of UNMIN’s monitoring capacity to ensure that the 
agreement to constrain the two armies was observed.  Yet it did the trick. In the year-and-a-
half period leading up to the elections, the head of the contingent, General Jan Erik 
Wilhelmsen, could report that   
 
there were no hostilities, nor clashes between the Parties, no attempts to 
occupy new ground, no laying of mines, no supply of ammunition or 
weaponry, no arming of civilians, no training of terrorists…. no  bombing of 
civilians and very limited hostile propaganda.128    
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There were of course points of tension and violations of both the text and spirit of the 
AMMAA. The tripartite JMCC investigated 88 complaints, ranging from “arbitrary detention, 
harassment and the denial of freedom of movement of people and goods” to illegal logging 
by the Maoists. Less than half (34) could be substantiated, almost all of which were violations 
by the Maoists.129 Yet these violations pale in significance compared to the general picture of 
two armies emerging from a bitter ten-year civil war to basically observe the peace agreement 
and related accords with only very light international monitoring.  
 
One main reason for this success was that both armies recognized they had reached a 
mutually hurting stalemate. The conflict had become more of a coordination than a 
cooperation “game”, in Michael Doyle’s terms.130 Still, even in cooperation games there are 
plenty of incentives to cheat. In fact, the Nepalese parties cheated on other aspects of the 
agreement relating to the strength of their armies, as we shall see below. But at the critical 
juncture between the signing of the peace agreement and the elections, they kept the peace 
despite a light and non-intrusive interntional monitoring regime. An important factor, 
according General Jan Erik Wilhelmsen, the chief UN official who helped construct and 
manage this regime in the field, was precisely its light and non-intrusive aspects. The AMO 
structure he promoted was based on his experience in other light observer missions, and 
centered on the principle of national ownership. Representatives of the two Nepalese armies 
had participated in the drafting of the AMMAA agreement negotiated by the political 
leadership – the UN provided only technical expertise. Both armies were represented on the 
high-level tripartite Commission that had ultimate responsibility for solving conflicts related 
to the monitoring, and both were represented on the field level in the joint village patrols. The 
result, according to Wilhelmsen, was a structure that created channels of communications, 
joint responsibility, mutual confidence, and therefore incentives to make the structure work.  
 
The high-level tripartite Commission gradually developed into an agency that could be used 
to consolidate the peace rather than serving partisan interests. The most striking evidence of 
its value in this regard occurred on the eve of the elections in April 2008. The Maoists had 
kidnapped and detained two off-duty Nepal Army soldiers, and the Chief of Army Staff, 
General Katawal, was livid. He ordered a Special Forces unit to prepare to surround the 
Maoist Headquarters in Kathmandu and, if necessary, to send a detachment to free the two 
men. If carried out, the move would likely have derailed the elections and could well have 
reignited the civil war. The Nepal Army representative on the JMCC took it upon himself to 
alert the UN chairman of the Commission, who in turn contacted Ian Martin, who conveyed a 
message of urgent concern to the Prime Minister, G.P. Koirala. At the last minute, Koirala 
reined in the Army chief and the crisis was averted.131 On a smaller scale at the field level, the 
Joint Monitoring Teams of Nepalese and Maoist soldiers plus an international observer 
helped to defuse local disputes and established communication channels that cut across 
institutional enemy lines in the best tradition of confidence- and peacebuilding practices.  
 
The fact that the international contingent would be unarmed and operate in small teams of 10 
scattered across a generally inaccessible countryside had made the military planners in UN 
headquarters initially oppose the plan, citing lack of force protection. Assessing the mission 
in retrospect, Wilhelmsen concluded that national ownership and the tripartite structure had 
served to provide force protection. The Nepalese parties had insisted on unarmed observers 
and faced up to the consequences. There were no security incidents directed against AMO 
personnel, which indicated both a strong commitment to the mission by the parties, as 
Wilhelmsen reported back to New York, and a capacity to control their forces. The absence 
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of weapons, moreover, “prevented escalation of tension at any incident….forcing 
protagonists to back down in negotiation.”132  
 
Despite these accomplishments, UNMIN came under severe criticism from the mainstream 
political parties and much of the press for not effectively monitoring the Maoist army. The 
initial row was over the registration and verification of Maoist soldiers in 2007, when AMO 
monitors worked with UNDP and UNICEF. Between the first and second phase registration 
in the PLA camps, around 8600 persons simply slipped out and disappeared. Many had been 
recent recruits and would not qualify under the verification criteria for bona fide combatants; 
a spontaneous demobilization was probably a useful outcome in this case. Others may have 
joined the paramilitary Yong Communist League that was operating freely. Given the limited 
UN presence that the Nepalese had permitted, and the widely scattered location of the camps 
in the cantonment sites, the UN monitors had no capacity to record, let alone prevent, such 
slippage and spontaneous demobilization. For the same reasons, the AMO were unable to 
prevent the PLA from taking the kidnapped businessman, Hari Ram Shrestha, inside a camp 
and killing him. Yet both incidents were used by the Nepali Congress and other parties that 
opposed the Maoists to attack UNMIN as being pro-Maoist.  
 
The volume of criticism increased markedly a year later when the video-scandal broke in 
May 2009. A (genuine) video was released, showing Prachanda giving a speech to cantoned 
PLA soldiers where he boasted of having tricked the UN in the numbers game during the 
registration by a very large margin. The UN had initially registered 30 000 soldiers; while the 
PLA in fact had only 7-8000 soldiers, Prachanda said. The speech had been made more than a 
year earlier in the midst of the election campaign, and Prachanda later excused himself to the 
new head of UNMIN, Karin Landgren, saying it was a difficult time in the peace process and 
the speech had been “necessary to boost… morale”.133 Yet the Maoists undoubtedly padded 
the camp figures. While cantoned, the soldiers were being paid and trained. A larger force 
would increase these benefits and be a useful bargaining chip in future negotiations on 
demobilization and reintegration as well. There was, however, little the UN could do in the 
matter. The Nepalese parties had defined the criteria for registration of Maoist soldiers in the 
AMMAA agreement, and the basis criterion for registration was the possession of a Maoist 
identity card. On this basis the UN initially registered 30 000 soldiers, the number was later 
reduced to around 19000 after “slippage” and further reductions according to other criteria 
formulated by the Nepalese parties in the AMMAA regarding age and date of joining.134  The 
discrepancy between an initial count of 30 000 soldiers and 3500 weapons suggests the 
number of soldiers was inflated and/or that at least some arms were stashed away. On the 
other hand, the Maoists had an unconventional military force and before an attack often sent 
in unarmed militias who beat drums and used loudspeakers to unnerve the enemy; the tactic 
seemed particularly effective when storming police posts.  
 
Nevertheless, the controversy over UNMIN’s role in the registration process once again 
underlined the political vulnerability of the mission. The Nepalese “have felt let down by 
UNMIN,” wrote the new mainstream publication Republica.135 The Nepali Congress bluntly 
demanded that the UN go back and do a re-count. Quite apart from the merits of the case, this 
was a golden opportunity for the mainstream parties to attack the Maoists and question the 
size of the PLA army as the basis for negotiations over its future disposition and integration 
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with the Nepal Army. Since the UN had been central in the verification process, UNMIN was 
targeted for criticism, and the timing made critics intensify the attack.  
 
The relationships between the Maoists-led government and the Nepal Army had by now 
deteriorated markedly, climaxing on April 4 when Prime Minister Prachanda sacked the 
Army Chief of Staff, General Katawal. The issue of integration of PLA members in the Nepal 
Army was at the heart of the conflict.  Katawal fought back, however, and as he mobilized 
the army leadership, hinted a coup was in the offing,136 and openly received support from 
India, Prachanda decided to resign. The very next day, May 5, the video was released (by his 
opponents). The Nepali Congress soon found additional reasons to discredit the credibility of 
the UN. When briefing  the Security Council on the evolving crisis between the Maoist-led 
government and the Army chief, UNMIN head Karin Landgren had said that Prachanda’s  
decision to sack General Katawal ‘reportedly’ had secured the agreement of the Nepali 
Congress.137 Whether correct or not, when the crisis resulted in Prachanda’s resignation, 
Katawal’s reinstatement with India’s blessing, and the opposition parties getting ready to take 
over the government, the Nepali Congress made very clear where it stood. The party 
leadership totally denied having supported the removal of Katawal and demanded that 
UNMIN retract and apologize. The NC-friendly Republica wrote in an editorial:  
 
If neutrality is the core principle of the UN, Landgren has recklessly violated 
it and has lost the trust and confidence of major stakeholders of the peace 
process. The UN headquarters should immediately recall Landgren and send 
someone else with a higher stature and integrity to redeem UN’s plummeting 
image in Nepal in the light of the series of recent events, including the recent 
exposé of Dahal’s video tape that showed how flawed the verification process 
was. 138  
 
The incident reveals again the instrumentalism in local attitudes towards the UN. The mission 
had become a convenient target in the political infighting over power and policies in the 
implementation of the peace agreement. Reasonable criticism could have been levied against 
UNMIN in the registration/verification process on the grounds that the UN had accepted a 
regulatory framework for monitoring that was too slack, providing too many loopholes to the 
parties and insufficient power to the UN. In other words, national ownership had produced 
less than optimal conditions for effective monitoring and conflict prevention. This point none 
of the Nepalese critics advanced, however. 
6.2 Assisting the elections 
Despite the limitations on the mission and the political brouhaha over the events in April and 
May, there is no question that UNMIN played a critical role in helping to bring the original 
conflict between the Maoists and the state from the military sphere and into the political 
arena. The stunning election victory of the Maoists confirmed that the original conflict had 
been transformed. The Maoists had reason to be confident that they could prevail through a 
political struggle. Even the conflict between the Army and the Maoists in early 2009 that 
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culminated in Prachanda’s resignation was not read by any informed observers as signaling a 
return to civil war. With the Maoists holding almost 40 percent of the seats in the Constituent 
Assembly, the mainstream parties recognized that they could not be ignored in any future 
political deal.  
 
The new Constituent Assembly was more inclusive of women, indigenous nationalities and 
traditionally marginalized castes than any previous assembly in Nepal’s history. This was 
fundamentally a result of long-term social change and the political upheaval of the past 
decade. By unequivocally endorsing the principles of social and political inclusion, UNMIN 
could take a small share of the credit for this change as well, although the mission earned 
more criticism than praise for its efforts. 
6.3 “A” for effort: mediation and army integration 
There were plenty of items on the negative side of the ledger, however. The peace process 
had not prevented - and partly given rise to - secondary conflicts involving collective 
grievances of marginalized groups, as well as violence involving less organized or criminal 
activity. There was also continuous tension over the issue of the 2-armies and the looming 
constitutional struggle. In all these areas the UN mission tried but failed to influence 
developments in a direction consonant with sustainable peace. 
 
The attempt to provide UN support for expanding the peace process to the emerging   conflict 
in the Terai was decisively rebuffed by the mainstream Nepalese parties and India, as 
recounted above. Absent an invitation to mediate, or at the very least acceptance of UN 
access to the disaffected groups, there was little the UN could do. Indeed, this was the lesson 
of the UN’s involvement in the original conflict between the Maoists and the state. The 
established parties had accepted UN involvement only when the local political dynamic made 
a solution appear likely and particular needs for UN services were identified. 
 
A similar situation arose with respect to the 2-armies problem. The relevant principles and a 
procedure had been established in the peace agreement, the AMMAA and the Interim 
Constitution of 2007.  Members of the PLA would be integrated in the security forces or 
return to civilian life, the Nepal Army would be democratized and a special political 
committee would be established to sort out the issues. Yet none of the agreements had 
substantive guidelines or figures and ceilings for integration. All the difficult issues were 
deferred, perhaps deliberately so, as the International Crisis Group concluded in February 
2009 when the parties seemed further apart than ever.139 Both had initially procrastinated to 
position themselves. The special committee was not established until October 2008 after 
much bickering, but was for three months boycotted by the Nepali Congress and as a result 
lacked quorum or at any rate political authority. Cast into opposition after the devastating 
election defeat earlier in the year, the Nepali Congress was fighting for its political life and 
appeared to embrace a spoiler role to discredit the Maoists. The Maoists, for their part, had 
been holding out for integration on favorable terms and in the meantime demonstrated their 
intransigence by refusing to discharge some 4000 soldiers from the cantonments who had 
been disqualified as bona fide combatants in the UN verification process.  
 
At one level the disagreement on standards for integration reflected the different nature of the 
two armies and related institutional interests. The Nepal Army insisted that integration must 
follow standardized, formal criteria of education and training for allocation of rank. The PLA, 
on the other hand, was a political army built on the basis of political commitment, 
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demonstrated leadership and field experience. Standard requirements would have placed most 
PLA members towards the low end of the hierarchy in the Nepal Army. The PLA leadership 
demanded recognition of combat experience and service - “respectful inclusion”, as a high-
level party official said. “We are an army, not a collection of terrorists. We did not surrender; 
we negotiated an end to the war.”140  
 
Behind the issue of standards was the principle of integration itself. It increasingly seemed 
that army leadership, above all the Chief of Army Staff, General Katawal, opposed 
integration in any form. The Army tended to view the PLA as consisting of political 
operatives who would de-professionalize the Nepal Army rather than soldiers. There was also 
deep mistrust.  Katawal, it will be recalled, had not even wanted Maoists in Joint Monitoring 
Teams inside the Army compounds. Just before the elections, the Army was “itching to 
provoke a confrontation with the Maoists soldiers”, the well-informed journalist Rita 
Manchanda wrote.141 There was suspicion that the Maoists had not abandoned their 
revolutionary objectives (a suspicion that public statements by hard-line party factions kept 
alive). In defiance of the peace agreement, the AMMAA and the principle of integration, 
Katawal prepared to fill vacancies in the Nepal Army with regular, non-Maoist recruits.  He 
had done so in 2007, but when he resumed the recruitment process in late 2008 he was 
nominally under the authority of a Maoist-led government which ordered him to desist. While 
the other parties in the Maoist-led coalition were uncertain, Prime Minister Prachanda 
decided to go ahead and sack the army chief on grounds of insubordination.  
 
UNMIN had tried to facilitate constructive discussion on the integration issue. Ian Martin had 
publicly urged the Special Political Committee to meet as the parties had formally and 
repeatedly agreed to in principle. UNMIN had also offered technical assistance to the talks, 
possibly through the established and well-functioning tripartite Commission (JMCC). All 
urgings and offers of assistance were in vain. Opposition from the Nepali Congress was one 
factor. Still in control of the party despite his advanced age and the spectacular election 
defeat, G.P. Koirala wanted to keep kept UNMIN out of the critically important issue on 
army integration. This view was shared more broadly, however. The matter was too sensitive 
and complicated for the UN to become involved in. 
 
UNMIN had taken the position taken since 2007 to the effect that new recruitment was a 
violation of both the text and spirit of the peace agreement and the AMMAA. Army 
supporters, however, argued that there was a legal basis for new recruitment. In the highly 
charged partisan politics of Nepal, Martin’s reiteration of the UN position during the 
controversy between the Army Chief and Prachanda was seen as unwanted interference or 
worse. An article in The Nepali Time called Martin’s statement as “clear an espousal of the 
Maoist cause as is prudentially possible” that, if not a breach of protocol, violated “accepted 
norms of diplomatic decency”.142 Again, no organized Nepali political group came to the 
UNMIN’s defense although international observers argued that it was perfectly correct for 
UMMIN to advice on the legality of activities directly related to agreements it had 
witnessed.143  
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The Nepali Times article had been headlined “It is Nepal’s army”, the implication being that 
UNMIN should step aside. Yet India stepped right into the controversy to ensure an outcome 
in favor of the Nepal Army and its supporters. A leading Nepalese commentator summarized 
India’s role: 
 
India did play an active role - first in telling the Maoists not to go ahead [and 
sack Katawal], then in encouraging the other parties to walk out of the 
alliance [the government coalition]; and in thinking of ways to prevent the 
implementation of the decision to sack General Katawal. But this should not 
have come as a surprise…. Delhi had made it clear innumerable times not 
only to the Maoists, but also to journalists and others, that they will not 
tolerate any messing around with the army structure. India had become 
increasingly suspicious of Maoist intentions, its efforts to cosy up with China, 
and this incident proved to be the breaking point. As a diplomat put it, "There 
is no point in pretending anymore. We hate each other's guts and the gloves 
are off."144 
 
The Maoists had possibly engaged in crisis maximization. Facing pressure from the 
hardliners in the party, slow progress of reconstruction, few political or economic 
achievements to show for its time in office, and mounting violence in the countryside, the 
Prime Minster might have concluded it was easier to be in the opposition. Resigning over a 
conflict with the Army - and being able to show an Indian hand in his ousting - earned the 
Party points on a left-nationalist rating.145 It was also a golden opportunity to repair internal 
divisions and consolidate the party. 
 
The political crisis soon faded into politics as usual as the other parties negotiated the 
formation of a new coalition and debated whether the Maoists should be invited in or allowed 
to dominate the opposition in the Constituent Assembly. The crisis had real costs, however. 
The continued existence of two irreconcilable armies was incompatible with sustained peace. 
On the Maoist side, long-term cantonment undermined morale. Conditions in the camps were 
spartan, with outbreaks of disease. More ominously, cadres were reportedly leaving the 
cantonments to join militias in the Terai and the Young Communist League. This was not 
only in violation of the peace agreement and the AMMAA, but suggested a gradual 
disintegration of the PLA into armed groups that would exacerbate Nepal’s growing problem 
of post-war violence perpetrated by incoherent and undisciplined armed groups. The prospect 
had been noted already in 2007 by worried UNMIN officials who saw comprehensive social 
security reform as a top priority. Yet absent stronger political backing from the Security 
Council and India, UNMIN could not proactively offer to assist in this area. 
 
The stand-off between the Army chief and the Maoist-led government raised the prospect of 
the Nepal Army moving towards an autonomous political role to protect its institutional and 
perceived national interests. The depth of antagonism towards the Maoists in the Army 
leadership is indicated by a description of a meeting of senior officers who reportedly were 
planning a coup after Prime Minister Prachanda had sacked General Katawal: 
 
Yesterday [ 23 April], 25 generals were present at the meeting of Principal 
Staff Officers at the Army Headquarters. The agenda was a serious one: 
Maoists are in a larger mission than to eliminate Nepal Army. They were out 
to derail the peace process and destroy Nepali democracy. And something had 
to be done to stop that.146 
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In a worse case scenario, the failure of army integration signaled new forms of violence 
brought on by a politicized national army and a disintegrating army of ex-rebels. Yet in a by 
now familiar dynamic, the crisis soon subsided with the help of some time and a political 
compromise. The new coalition government  retired Katawal (on schedule), and chose as a 
new Army chief a general reputed to be less political, less tied to the Palace, and representing 
for the first time a traditionally marginalized group in this position.147  
6.4 Technical assistance 
6.4.1 Under-age soldiers 
Both the Nepalese parties had agreed in the peace agreement   
 
not to include or use children who are under 18 years old and below in the 
armed force. Children thus affected would be instantaneously rescued and 
necessary and suitable assistance would be provided for their rehabilitation 
(Art 7.6). 
 
The provision was quite clear and was reiterated in the subsequent agreement on monitoring 
and management of arms and armies (AMMAA). More broadly, the provision was anchored 
in a growing body of international law to protect children and their rights in armed conflict.  
UN Security Council Resolution 1612 of July 2005 had been used as an early point of access 
by the UN system to monitor and report on the impact of the civil war on children in Nepal. 
In this connection, the PLA’s use of child soldiers was highlighted, reasonably well known, 
and a point of repeated international censure.148 It came as no great surprise that the UN 
registration and verification of the Maoist cantonments in 2007 identified some 3000 
combatants as minors, i.e. under 18 years of age as of 25 May 2006 (the date before the 
cease-fire code of conduct was signed). The discharge of these minors, however, became a 
long, complicated and controversial process. The UN, the donor community and the non-
Maoist political class in Nepal were aligned on one side; the Maoists were on the other. 
 
Several UN agencies and offices were involved. UNMIN was concerned with matters of 
policy and principles, UNICEF had responsibility for technical assistance, and the New 
York–based Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children in Armed Conflict, 
Radhika Coomaraswamy, visited Nepal to lend the weight of her office to monitor the 
situation and find a solution. On the program level, however, the issue had stalled completely.  
UNICEF had in 2007 worked with the Ministry for Peace and Reconstruction to come up 
with a plan of action to demobilize and reintegrate the under-age PLA soldiers. The ministry 
was then controlled by the Nepali Congress and the Maoists, not surprisingly, were quite 
unresponsive. Yet the situation improved only marginally after the April 2008 elections when 
a Maoist became Minister for Peace and Reconstruction.  
 
The Maoists and UNICEF were basically speaking two different languages. UNICEF 
approached the problem in a legal-technocratic perspective. If the UN were to assist, UN 
principles must apply, in particular the Paris Principles of 2007 dedicated to the rights of the 
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children. It did not help that UNICEF’s plan for demobilization and reintegration was 
modeled on UNICEF-assisted programs for child soldiers in West Africa. The premise was 
that the children had to be “returned to their community and to their families”, and “freely 
choose” their plans for the future in a setting “completely removed from the military”, 
according to the UNICEF program officer. 149 
 
The Maoists had a different perspective. At one level, the minors represented a source of 
income for the families concerned (cantoned soldiers received salaries). Given Nepal’s high 
unemployment rate among young men, it was not an unimportant consideration. The 
disqualified combatants also represented a bargaining chip in negotiations with the UN or the 
government over other disputed issues (late salaries, poor camp conditions and security sector 
reform). More fundamentally, the PLA was a political army and the youngsters represented 
valuable political capital. By 2007-8, they might be in their late teens or even older. Some 
had joined voluntarily and with their families, or because family members had been killed or 
displaced. Some were clearly committed despite a young age. The noted Nepalese social 
scientist Deepak Thapa has described an encounter with a young, “very young” Maoist 
soldier, noting his “childlike wonder” but also “steely resolution [that] gave us a glimpse of 
the kind of motive force that has driven the ‘people’s war’”.150 Other children had been had 
been taken from schools or their families.151 Either way, the Maoist leadership hesitated to let 
their young cadres go without maintaining some control and future influence. The Maoist 
Minister for Peace and Reconstruction, Janardan Sharma, had been one of the five regional 
commanders of the PLA, but by late 2008 he was working towards a compromise. He 
proposed to UNICEF a demobilization scheme where the under-age soldiers would retrain in 
a setting close to the camps. UNICEF refused. 
 
A process of conflict resolution in slow motion was nevertheless discernible. Other offices in 
the UN system in Kathmandu recognized the inappropriateness of off-the-shelf programs. So 
did the Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict. Speaking to a high-level 
international meeting, Radhika Coomaraswamy cited the case of Nepal to stress the need for 
context sensitivity. 
 
“L”, a young girl in Nepal….. had run away to join the Maoists because of domestic 
violence in the home by her stepfather. After the peace process began, she did not 
want to go back home to her family or to her community. As a soldier she had learnt 
leadership skills and had a measure of confidence. She knew that the patriarchal 
norms of a traditional society would rob her of those advantages….[W]hat do we do 
if children find traditional communities too oppressive and confining?152 The Paris 
Principles give us clear guidance on reintegrating the vast majority of child soldiers 
but we must also deal with the children who fall between the cracks. 
 
 
                                                     
149 Interview with author, Kathmandu, December 2008. 
150 Thapa, op.cit.  pp. 3-4.  
151 UN figures suggests a rash of abductions just around the time of the cease-fire (1576 documented cases 
between October and December 2006), evidently to boost the camp figure. About one-third, however, returned 
home or were released’ after a few days. Report of the Secretary-General on the request of Nepal for UN 
assistance in support of its peace process, S/2007/442, 18 July 2007, p. 4 and 7. A Human Rights Watch report 
describing Maoists techniques for recruiting children cited kidnapping, abducting pupils from schools,  running 
propaganda campaigns to attract child ‘volunteers’, and in areas under their control, requiring each family to 
assign one child to the Party. http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/01/30/nepal-maoists-should-release-
child-soldiers . Long-time observers of the war suggest the term ‘abduction’ gives a misleading impression. In 
“group abductions”, the Maoist would take a class of school children to a camp for training/indoctrination for a 
week or so, and then let them go. Some would opt to stay voluntarily.  The Maoists did a form of  conscription in 
areas under their control, however. 
152 Statement to Paris Principles Meeting 26, September 2008 http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/26-sept-
2008-paris-principles-meeting.html 
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The Maoists appeared to recognize the strain of the situation, and there were reports in early 
2009 that a solution was in the offing. The fall of the Maoist cabinet in May 2009 did not 
derail the process entirely. The new government, led by the mainstream communist party 
UML, announced in mid-July that it had decided to discharge the 4 008  disqualified 
combatants – including 2973 who were minors at the time of the UN verification process in 
2007 – and who would be rehabilitated with the assistance of UNICEF and UNDP. The 
decision was of course meaningless without the cooperation of the Maoist commanders, who 
were in control of the camps. It was now revealed that Prachanda earlier had agreed “in 
principle’ to the discharge, and a new round of negotiations started. The Maoists were still 
holding out for jobs in the security sector, particularly for those who were no longer minors, 
whether in the border security force, the army or private security companies.153 For these 
persons, little rehabilitation assistance would be required.  
6.4.2  UNDP’s “core peacebuilding areas” 
Having worked in Nepal since 1963, UNDP adjusted its activities to the demands of the post-
war situation. The agency launched a program in “core peacebuilding areas” in 2007 that 
included assistance for recovery and reintegration of displaced persons, support to the 
constitutional process and electoral assistance. Chief among these was the constitutional 
support program. 154 
 
During the first phase, the agency made available an international constitutional expert to 
assist with the preparation of the Interim Constitution and the future work of the 
Constitutional Assembly. The Nepalese, however, did not eagerly solicit his advice.155  The 
reaction probably reflected a measure of fatigue with international experts who were arriving 
to offer advice on peace and constitutional restructuring of the state. The Nepalese were 
asked to consider various models of federalism, including the Canadian, the Swiss, and the 
Indian version. The advice might seem gratuitous given the enormous complexities, divisions 
and sensitivities of Nepal’s social and political scene, as Nepalese commentators liked to 
point out. Advice designed to help the traditionally marginalized group, in particular, touched 
core political conflicts. Yet UNDP persisted. After the Constituent Assembly elections were 
finally held, almost a year after the original schedule, and with the Assembly working 
towards a tight deadline of producing a new constitution within 16 months, UNDP launched 
an ambitious and greatly expanded constitutional support program.  
 
The program had two pillars: One was technical assistance to members of the Constituent 
Assembly, including the establishment of a resource centre and meeting place located at the 
Assembly grounds. A second and potentially more controversial activity was to facilitate 
contact between the people and the elected members; “to give voice to the people”, especially 
the marginalized groups, as a UN staff member put it.156 To this end, UNDP planned to work 
on two levels. Nationally, it would organize conferences and thematic reports on issues or 
views of particular communities that would be submitted to the Constituent Assembly 
committees. On the local level, UNDP would work with non-governmental organizations to 
establish a vast, “constitution-building network” of 30 000 community groups, orchestrated 
by some 900 community workers and reinforced by radio programs, all designed to foster 
 
                                                     
153 “ Maoists demand integration of disqualified PLA men also,” Kantipur Report, 17 July 2009, 
www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?nid=204786 
154 Support to Participatory Constitution Building in Nepal, UNDP 2008 www.undp.org/Crisis Prevention & 
Recovery – Programme — UNDP in Nepal.mht. downloaded February 2009. 
155 Whitfield, op.cit., p.27. 
156 Interview,UNDP officials, Kathmandu, December 2009. 
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informed participation about constitutional rights, obligations and issues. To run the program, 
a staff of 35 would be hired at headquarters level.  
 
In some respects, it was not an unusual program in the inventory of UN support to post-
conflict peacebuilding processes. In view of Nepal’s well-established political parties, highly 
developed civil society, it seemed a bit of an over-kill of the kind likely to alienate Nepal’s 
political and intellectual classes. As for civil society, the Nepalese commonly distinguished 
between the NGO-cum-consultancy sector and the rest.157  The ‘genuine civil society’, the 
writer and activist Shyam Shrestha noted, was led by people who spearheaded the Jana 
Andolan II in 2006 – doctors, lawyers, teachers, writers and journalists. Unless these groups 
were involved, the constitutional movement would not engage the people and would not 
work. 158  In this case, the main impact of the UNDP program would be to generate 
employment for Nepal’s sizable NGO-cum-consultancy sector. Some skepticism was also 
noticeable among the political parties, including from a Madhesi party whose secretary-
general noted that it was “the job of the political parties”, not UNDP, to establish 
communication between the people and Constituent Assembly members.159  Nor was the 
program developed in cooperation with the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, which by 
late 2008 was in the process of establishing local peace committees and assessing how they 
could be used in the constitutional process.160 Formally designed to promote peace, 
reconciliation, the committees also served as an infrastructure for exercising political control. 
How the networks of UNDP and the Ministry would relate to each other, if at all, was 
unclear, and at the central level the two agencies were competing for the same pool of donor 
money designated for peacebuilding and constitutional support. 
6.5 The watchdog 
Ian Martin’s attempt in late 2007 to secure a broader mandate to support the peace process 
had been blocked. Yet in his capacity as SRSG and head of a mission originally requested by 
the Nepalese to assist with “the entire peace process”, Martin retained the possibly more 
important role of general watchdog.  
 
The peace agreement was mostly formulated in non-specific terms. The subsequent AMMAA 
on the management of arms and armies likewise left major issues of integration unspecified. 
Implementing the agreements consequently required substantive negotiations on major issues 
where the parties held conflicting views or interests. It was a deeply political process; 
qualitatively different from implementation in a technical sense. To facilitate this process the 
parties had agreed to establish several commissions or committees, but few functioned 
satisfactorily if they were established at all. A pattern soon developed whereby additional 
commissions or committees were promised when new conflicts arose, or, more commonly, 
the parties reiterated their commitment to empower the commissions and committees they 
had previously agreed to in principle.  
 
In December 2007, the Maoists and the Nepali Congress repaired a major crisis in their 
relationship by signing a 23-point agreement that included establishing 5 commissions and 2 
committees to help implement the agreement, most of which had already been  referenced in 
 
                                                     
157 See Seira Tamang, “Civilising Civil Society: Donors and democratic space in Nepal” in Himal. South Asia 
Magazine, Vol. 16, No. 7, 2005, pp.14-24. 
158 Interview with author, Kathmandu, December 2008. 
159 Interview with author, Kathmandu, December 2008. 
160 Interview, Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, Kathmandu, December 2008. 
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the agreement.161 Two were related to human rights (Commission for the Investigation of the 
Disappeared, and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission), three would deal with specific 
reforms (a special committee on army integration, a state reconstruction commission, and a 
commission on land reform), one was to work on peacebuilding (a high level peace 
commission with counterparts on the local level) and one was a high-level committee with 
the general task of monitoring compliance with the peace agreement. 
 
The peace agreement and the 23-point agreement were useful reference points for UN 
officials to monitor the pace of implementation, and as the principal watchdog Martin 
pursued the task relentlessly. His words carried weight by virtue of personal status, long 
tenure in Nepal, and formal rank. Nevertheless, his efforts were hampered by the absence of a 
national counterpart that was formally responsible for monitoring the implementation of the 
agreement. In Martin’s own view, as he reflected on the mission towards the end of his term, 
this was what he needed most. 162 A high-level multiparty commission accountable and 
responsible for monitoring the implementation phase could have turned national ownership of 
the process into an effective tool for peacebuilding. Martin repeatedly called attention to this 
point, as did his successor, Karin Landgren.163 
 
The Nepalese had agreed to establish such a mechanism as one of the seven 
commissions/committees, but it was never done. An interim committee (Peace and Conflict 
Management Committee) was formed instead, but with an unclear mandate, an interim status, 
and not constituted at the highest-level of authority; it soon faded into obscurity. Its fate 
reflected the deeply political nature of the monitoring task: a national commission could have 
been effective if the parties had agreed sufficiently to establish one, which they did not. 
 
Deep disagreement on substantive issues of implementation surfaced in the procedural 
debates on specific committees and commissions. A draft bill to establish a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission was proposed by the Nepali Congress-led interim government, 
but its lack of guarantees for independence provoked such a storm of protest that it was 
dropped. The Maoist-led government drafted a slightly less partisan bill in the fall of 2008, 
but against local and international protest decided to promulgate it as an ordinance instead of 
risk running it through the Parliament. Similarly, the Maoist government prepared to establish 
a commission on disappearances in late 2008, but decided to promulgate the enabling 
legislation as an ordinance in February 2009. The special committee on army integration, as 
we have seen, took a long time to even meet because the preliminary consensus was lacking. 
The Maoist government did establish a high-level commission to study land reform in 
December 2008 (an issue that UNMIN did not address) and a Ministry of State 
Reconstruction (to take the place of the commission promised in the 23-point agreement). 
The fate of the former was uncertain when the Maoists left the government in May 2009. 
Both the interim government and the Maoist government used the Ministry of Peace and 
Reconstruction to establish political controls over locally based peace commissions, and 
neither government launched a high-level peace commission. 
 
Nevertheless, over time there was some movement towards establishing all but one of the 
promised commissions or committees and it is reasonable to assume that international 
monitoring and urgings did contribute. A general watchdog role of the kind exercised by an 
active SRSG is akin to an informal power broker, heavily dependent upon personal status and 
formal rank. This is particularly the case in a fragile peace process, characterized inter alia by 
 
                                                     
161 23-point agreement by the Seven-Party Alliance. 23 December 2007. Unofficial translation. 
www.unmin.org.np  
162Interview December 2009 
163 Landgren brief to the Security Council, op,cit. The ICG strongly endorsed this argument as well. February 
2009 report, op.cit. 
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the absence of a national monitoring body, as in Nepal.  Early downsizing of the mission 
weakened the watchdog role by assigning the successor a lower rank, breaking the continuity 
of leadership, and requiring the new head of mission to invest in building up personal 
networks and knowledge.  
 
Having a specialized mandate, OHCHR monitored human rights issues related to peace 
agreement and more generally in relation to international human rights law. Not being 
integrated with UNMIN – and deliberately maintaining a distinction by having mostly blue, 
not white vehicles - the field mission’s human rights work proceeded somewhat apart from 
the more controversial political monitoring of UNMIN. Controversy surrounding the renewal 
of UNMIN mission every half year did not seem to affect OHCHR.  
7. Conclusions  
As the timing suggests, Nepal’s civil war was very much a local conflict. The Nepalese 
Maoists launched a ‘people’s war’ a few years after the global struggle between communism 
and capitalism had ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the capitalist 
transformation of China. As a result, the revolutionary struggle in the small kingdom wedged 
in between India and China unfolded without creating much international interest except for 
India. Although the Nepalese government linked up with the globalized U.S. ‘war on terror’ 
by branding the Maoists as terrorist, national factors remained the primary determinants of 
events as the conflict ran its course and ended with a comprehensive peace agreement in 
2006. By this time, it was widely accepted inside Nepal and among international agencies 
concerned that the peace process was largely nationally owned. The claim was validated 
above all in early 2006 when massive demonstrations of ‘people’s power’ in favor of peace 
and democracy brought down the monarchy and removed the last obstacles in the peace 
negotiations. In view of this, it was perhaps not surprising that the UN peace operation to 
help implement the 2006 agreement would be a minimalist mission. It was a testimony to a 
high degree of national ownership, but also – and contrary to the narrative of “national 
ownership” – Indian concern to limit the role of the UN. 
 
The mission thus had an unusually thin mandate. UNMIN had no peacekeepers, even the 
military observers had to be unarmed and in civilian attire, no international police contingent, 
and no mandate to mediate. The Nepalese and the Indians held on to these principles even 
when the peace process appeared to derail as the elections were postponed, new conflicts 
erupted and critical security sector reforms stalled. On the Nepalese side, one reason was the 
ideological value of national ownership and common opposition to UN assistance in other 
than technical matters. The intensely partisan nature of Nepalese politics and the deeply 
divided peacebuilding process also constrained the UN. All Nepalese parties viewed the UN 
instrumentally, and each was convinced that giving the UN more room would benefit the 
other. The lack of local neutral forces or institutions that could cushion the divisive nature of 
domestic politics thus affected UNMIN as well. 
 
UNMIN nevertheless performed two critical peacebuilding functions. First, its role in 
monitoring the two armies in the transition period and assisting the elections was essential to 
move the conflict from the military to the politics arena. The presence of a credible and 
impartial third party was required to seal the bargain in the peace agreement that stipulated 
elections but permitted the rebels to maintain their army, while cantoning both armies in the 
transition period. By standard peacebuilding criteria, the sequence was wrong. Rebel armies 
should be demobilized before the elections to avoid the example etched into the collective 
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UN consciousness by Jonas Savimbi in Angola in 1992.164 In Nepal, there was indeed some 
fear that the Maoists would return to the jungle if they lost badly in the elections. Afterwards, 
despite – or because – of the Maoist electoral victory, violence and mutual suspicion 
remained. By mid-2009, three years after the peace agreement, many suspected that the 
Maoists remained committed to the revolution. The political establishment of upper castes 
and classes had not been fundamentally weakened by the war. The Nepal Army was 
unreformed. Critical and difficult issues in the peace agreement were unresolved relating to 
constitutional restructuring of the state, integration of the two armies, and promises to include 
the traditionally marginalized groups. Yet it seems clear that the 2008 elections was a 
watershed in the conflict between the Maoists and the Nepalese state, and the UN mission 
was decisive in getting the conflict over the critical hump and firmly planted in the realm of 
political competition. 
 
In this regard, the UN military monitors provided an element of the “security guarantee” that 
Walter has identified as critical to consolidate peace agreements that end civil wars.165 The 
Nepalese case shows that this guarantee can come in many forms and, contrary to Stedman’s 
criticism, can have the intended effect even if it is not – as it rarely can be - an ironclad 
mechanism.166 The 182 UN observers armed solely with a blue UN cap and dispersed in 
Nepal’s difficult terrain certainly could not prevent a return to violence if the parties were 
bent on this course. They could not even monitor the cantoned armies on a regular basis. Yet 
their very presence served as a trip wire and hence a deterrence against defections from the 
agreement. Moreover, the contingent had additional, innovative features. Representatives of 
the two armies patrolled together and served on a high-level commission to resolve conflict. 
The tripartite arrangement constituted an infrastructure for confidence building that had a 
documented effect in preventing renewed armed conflict between the two armies. Timing was 
also important. Unusually quick reaction in the UN and flexible financial support from key 
donors (particularly Norway) made it possible to field the AMO as soon as the peace 
agreement was soon.  
 
A limited observer mission of this kind has greater chance of success if the belligerents have 
reached a mutually hurting stalemate, are relatively well organized, and are at least tactically 
committed to the peace agreement. In these conditions, a minimalist contingent can function 
effectively and avoid the well-know distortions and costs associated with a larger mission.167 
The point has a lessons-learned relevance for the UN Secretariat, particularly the DPKO 
which initially opposed the unorthodox and minimalist mission design. 
 
The second and less recognized importance of UNMIN was the role of the SRSG in 
monitoring the implementation of the agreement, keeping the parties’ feet to the fire, and 
providing regular reports to the UN system on the development of a process that otherwise 
received little international attention. Heads of UN peace operations customarily take on a 
watchdog function, whether specifically included in their mandate or not. Since most 
peacebuilding processes are conflictual – whether the peace agreement is quite general (as in 
Nepal’s case) or enormously specific in detailing the parties and their role (as in the Dayton 
Agreement for Bosnia) – there is a role for an impartial monitor of the implementation 
process. The concept of “censor” in the original Roman meaning of the terms captures its 
essence.168 The task of a censor of peace agreements would be to uphold the morality of the 
peace agreement, so to speak, by monitoring adherence and calling on the parties to honor 
 
                                                     
164 Savimbi lost the elections but had retained his army and returned to war. 
165  Walter , op.cit. .  
166  Stedman, op.cit. 
167 Chiyuki Aoi et al., Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations, Tokyo: UNU press, 2007. 
168 The Roman censors were the highest magistrates in the realm. They were responsible for maintaining the 
census, some aspects of public finance and works, and for upholding public morality. 
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their commitments and obligations. The SRSG in Nepal tried to do this, but was limited by 
the absence of a national counterpart that could lend weight and legitimacy to the ‘censoring’ 
role. The Nepalese parties recognized in principle the importance of such a national 
mechanism and had repeatedly agreed to establish a high-level commission to monitor and 
facilitate the implementation of the peace agreement. Despite their commitment in principle, 
which was strongly reinforced by the SRSG and supportive international observers, the 
commission had by mid-2009 not materialized. Given the divisive and partisan nature of the 
peace implementation process, it was at any rate an open question if a commission would 
function effectively even if established in name.  
 
How does the Nepal case fit with the academic literature that concludes in favor of intrusive, 
multidimensional peace missions? At first glance, the fit is poor insofar as much of this 
literature presumes that the target country is a ‘failed state’. Sometimes made explicitly, as in 
Krasner’s work on ‘shared sovereignty’, more often a ‘failed state’ is conflated with 
contemporary post-conflict situations in general.169 Some quantitative literature fails to 
distinguish between types of post-war situations at all, yet produces policy recommendations 
for intrusive missions that would seem most appropriate for a thoroughly failed state 
(however defined). 170 Common to all is that the question of host country consent is ignored 
or taken for granted. 
 
In taxonomic terms, the Nepal civil war is markedly different from the wars in the ‘failed 
states’ of West Africa and West Asia. The family resemblance is rather to the civil wars in 
Central America in the 1970s and 1980s. There are some similarities in the peace processes 
as well. UN peace operations in Central Aemrica did not have armed peacekeepers, and, 
while multidimensional, had strong national counterparts in both the state and civil society. 
Although the term was not yet in vogue, peacebuilding was not premised on a “failed state” 
but the existence of considerable national capacity. National capacity, of course, is not 
automatically or necessarily harnessed in service of the peace agreement. This leads to the 
question of what are good indicators of national capacity for peacebuilding, and what the 
Nepal case can contribute here.  
 
One of the few attempts in the literature to address this issue and systematically examine the 
relationship between local capacity and international assistance to peacebuilding is the 
seminal work by Doyle and Sambanis.171 Building on both quantitative and qualitative 
analysis, they start by distinguishing between easy and hard cases (hard cases have high death 
and discplacement during the conflict, a large number of adversarial factions, and a strong 
ethnic element). Indicators for local capacity and international assistance are then defined, 
and held up against the degree of success in building peace  (measured statistically by return 
to large-scale violence and ‘participatory democracy’). They find, first, that UN missions 
increases the chances of peace, and multidimensional missions provide most value-added, 
and, second, that international assistance can substitute for local capacity. These findings are 
not readily supported by the Nepal case.  
 
On the easy-hard continuum, Nepal would probably be located somewhere towards the 
difficult end (relatively low death and displacement score during the conflict, but high on 
number of factions and high on ethnicity if that is taken to include caste). On the indicators 
for local capacity for peace, Nepal would rate very low. The Doyle and Sambanis indicators 
 
                                                     
169 Krasner, op.cit. 
170 See e.g. Collier, op.cit. and Fearon &Laitin, op.cit. The latter argue for long-term interntional military presence 
to both maintain order and save the host country expenditures for development. 
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are purely economic, while the Nepal case demonstrates what other studies also have shown, 
namely that political and institutional capacity on both the state and civil society level can be 
high and independent of the level of economic growth and electricity consumption (which 
Doyle and Sambanis have chosen as indicators).172 Political mobilization of people’s power 
in particular was crucial in moving the peace process forward in 2006 and at the core of the 
Nepalese claim to national ownership. As for the outcome, we have seen that, contrary to the 
aggregate trends, a minimalist mission was sufficient to help transition the original conflict 
from the military to the political realm and UNMIN’s election assistance helped meet the 
Doyle and Sambanis criteria for participatory democracy as well. Secondary conflicts and 
low-level violence did erupt, however, and to that extent confirms the thesis that 
peacebuilding associated with minimalist missions is fragile.173 
 
More problematic is the central thesis in Doyle and Sambanis to the effect that international 
assistance can substitute for local capacity. The thesis makes no allowance for nationalist 
reactions, whether in response to genuinely distorting effects of foreign presence or the more 
intangible ‘white vehicle syndrome’. In the Nepalese case such reactions were probably 
accentuated by a strong commitment to national ownership of the peace negotiations, yet 
nationalist reactions of this kind are familiar in all peace operations. These reactions limited 
UNMIN’s political room for action, and, when backed by the Indian government for other 
reasons, blocked the possibility for increasing international assistance at a juncture when the 
peace process appeared to stall. This points to a second problematic aspect of the substitution 
thesis. International substitution for lack of local capacity cannot secure a local peace process 
unless national interests are given voice from the beginning. In other words, the internationals 
would need to promote national capacity rather than substituting for its absence from the very 
beginning. 
 
The significance of India’s role in the peace process is echoed in the literature that 
emphasizes the regional context, going back to Hampson’s early work on this 
subject.174Nepal was not located in a ‘bad neighborhood’ in the sense that its neighbors 
backed rival domestic factions in a pattern of competitive interventions that is nearly certain 
to undermine peace, as demonstrated elsewhere from Cambodia to Afghanistan. The India 
government was the sole, if active and principal, external actor to exercise partisan influence. 
At one critical point, this benefitted the peace negotiations (when India abandoned support 
for the King). Subsequently, however, Indian constraint had the opposite effect, particularly 
in supporting the Army against an elected government, and more generally in blocking well-
intended UN efforts to negotiate in secondary conflicts. The Indian position sheltered Nepal 
against the possibility of an intrusive UN role, but in part filled that space with Indian 
influence which constrained the development of genuine Nepalese national ownership.  
 
In the 2009 report of the UN Secretary-General on peacebuilding, national ownership appears 
as axiomatically good because it is defined as the ownership of something positive (‘the 
peace process”). A more critical understanding of the concept would allow for the potential of 
national ownership to derail a peace process as well as keeping it on track. The point emerges 
clearly from the Nepal case study. The narrative of national ownership was celebrated by 
both Nepalese and internationals, but the Nepalese at times slowed the implementation of the 
peace agreement almost to a halt, haggled over old issues and clashed over new ones, refused 
 
                                                     
172 A major work here is Adam Przeworski et.al., Democracy and Development, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000. 
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Institute of Peace, 1996. 
CMI WORKING PAPER UN SUPPORT FOR PEACEBUILDING: NEPAL AS THE EXCEPTIONAL CASE WP 2009: 7 
 
 48 
collectively to address issues of impunity for past violence and failed to prevent renewed 
violence. The political process somehow still moved forward - the elections were finally held, 
the resignation of the first Maoist government was followed by parliamentary negotiations 
between a new coalition and a new opposition, and the confrontation between the Army and 
the Maoists over the attempted sacking of Army Chief was at least temporarily defused by the 
appointment of a new general more agreeable to all sides. While slow and tortuous, it started 
to look like politics as usual. Yet the undercurrent of continued violence was real. To the 
extent that the Nepalese ownership weakened the peace process, the result was not the 
prospect of renewed war between the Maoist and the state but various forms of ‘post-conflict’ 
violence: scattered, low-level violence arising from the legacy of the war, and organized 
violence arising from unfulfilled promises of the peace agreement to restructure the state in 
ways that would reduce social exclusion and open for full political inclusion.  
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transitional justice – and target the underlying causes of confl ict as well. Peacebuilding 
means ensuring that “exclusionary social, economic and political structures … [are not] 
left untouched, perpetuated or strengthened,” UN Secretary-General Kofi  Annan declared 
when he inaugurated the UN Peacebuilding Commission in 2006.   The language seemed 
tailor-made for Nepal, where the UN established a peace mission after the end of a ten-
year civil war. Yet the UN operation to help consolidate peace in Nepal was a ‘focused 
mission of short duration’, a minimalist operation with a razor-thin mandate. 
This paper explores why this was so, and what were the consequences for peacebuilding.
Was a limited UN mission appropriate to the challenges of peacebuilding, or was the 
mission unduly restricted? Did a high degree of Nepali ‘national ownership’ consolidate 
or complicate the peace process? 
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